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 1 
Introduction
I
n the space of 10 years, two economies that barely traded, let alone 
exchanged investments, have become major trade partners. Driven by 
a booming exchange in commodities for manufacturing goods, trade 
between China and Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) grew at a 
breakneck annual average rate of 31.2 percent between 2000 and 2011, 
only briefly interrupted by the financial crisis in 2009. Through this process, 
China became LAC’s second-largest trade partner—accounting for 13.7 
percent of the region’s trade in 2015—and the largest trade partner of 
countries such as Brazil, Chile and Peru. Though reaching more modest 
levels, LAC’s share of China’s trade also increased substantially, reaching 
5.9 percent in 2015 as the region became a key supplier of raw materials 
such as copper, iron ore and soybeans.
Since 2012, however, this boom seems to have come to an end. 
Bilateral trade growth has decelerated sharply and turned negative in 
2014, on the back of marked and intertwined slowdowns in the growth 
of China and LAC, the origins of which range from a protracted recovery 
of the world economy to the diminishing returns of China’s growth, to 
macroeconomic mismanagement in some of the largest LAC economies. 
This turn of events has raised questions about the future of the relationship. 
Does this slowdown signal a new pattern and loss of dynamism for bilateral 
trade or just a strong cyclical adjustment, prompted by an unusually long 
commodity cycle?
The right answer to this question seems to combine elements of both 
explanations, but cyclical adjustment appears to explain most of the story, 
if only because there has been no significant change in the fundamentals 
behind the dynamism of the last decade. Yes, China is unlikely to return 
to double-digit growth because it is already experiencing inexorable 
diminishing returns. As its capital stock grows and the productivity gains 
associated with moving people to more productive activities are exhausted, 
return on investment tends to fall and so does growth. Lower growth, in 
turn, compounded by the growing share of services in gross domestic 
product (GDP), translates into less dynamic demand for commodities.
However, with a GDP per capita of US$7,989 (IMF, 2016), China is still 
far from experiencing the low rates of return seen in developed countries 
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or their share of services in GDP. This is why most analysts do not see 
China’s annual growth falling below 6 percent at least until the end of this 
decade. If we add to these expectations the fact that the country’s natural 
resource constraints will not improve, it is easy to see a scenario in which 
the growth in demand for LAC commodities remains robust, though not as 
epic as in the last decade. Likewise, factor endowments on both sides of 
the relationship suggest that LAC will remain a major importer of Chinese 
manufacturing goods, though the composition of such imports is likely to 
change as China’s wages, capital stock and human capital continue to grow.
In sum, looking forward, there is no good reason to believe that the 
bilateral trade will become less relevant or that its pattern will be radically 
altered. The most likely scenario is one of a more mature relationship, one 
that is still extremely positive, but where both governments and private 
sectors will have to work much harder to fully enjoy its potential gains. 
There will be less tolerance of the sort of neglect for trade barriers that has 
marked the boom years.
That is particularly the case for most of LAC, which was granted 
a huge market for its commodities almost overnight, and therefore had 
few incentives to develop a more forceful trade policy. It was only late in 
the decade that governments and the private sector came to realize that 
one of the major concerns revealed during the boom—the overwhelming 
concentration of the region’s exports in a handful of commodities—could not 
be addressed without improving their access to the Chinese market. Chile, 
Peru and, more recently, Costa Rica were notable exceptions. China, in turn, 
despite several barriers imposed on its manufacturing exports, particularly 
in the Southern Cone, mostly chose to look the other way, which is perhaps 
explained by the fact that these barriers were not seriously hurting Chinese 
exports to the region, which were almost trebling every four years.
In this scenario, where epic and effortless gains are things of the past, 
we expect that the importance of trade policy will increase, but that any 
great policy-related activism will face significant obstacles. There is not 
enough information on the specifics of China’s trade regime, nor enough 
policy analysis of its impacts on trade and investment flows. LAC’s trade 
regime, with a few exceptions, is better documented, but there is also not a 
critical mass of analytical work to guide policy decisions.
This report hopes to contribute to closing this gap by offering a 
more detailed analysis of trade barriers and their impact on both sides of 
the relationship. It is not intended to be exhaustive. It focuses mainly on 
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more pressing market access issues, identified by an extensive analysis of 
trade data and official documents, as well as by several interviews with 
government officials and firm executives. Most of the equally important, 
but exceedingly complex, government support issues are left for future 
research.
Within the realm of market access, the focus is on non-tariff barriers, 
which are generally more obscure and challenging to assess and seem to be 
particularly binding for LAC agricultural trade and for China’s manufacturing 
exports. The former tend to be up against quotas, tariff-rate quotas (TRQs), 
price controls, state trading and inscrutable sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures. The latter often face constantly changing technical barriers, 
arbitrary custom valuations, non-automatic import licenses and contingent 
trade-remedy measures (anti-dumping, countervailing and safeguards), 
which use the so-called surrogate country method to establish dumping, 
relying on price or production data from third countries.
The analysis is divided into three sections. The first examines the 
main costs encountered by LAC exporters in China, the second looks at 
the “frictions” faced by their Chinese counterparts in the region and the 
final section summarizes the main findings and outlines both policy and 
research agendas.
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TABLE 1/
China’s import 
tariffs, 2013
Accessing the Chinese market: 
trade barriers to LAC firms
L
AC’s well known difficulties to diversify its exports to China—iron 
ore, soybeans, copper and oil still account for more than 80 percent 
of shipments—go well beyond trade costs and are rooted in plain 
comparative advantages and historically low investments in education and 
science and technology. That does not mean, however, that trade barriers 
do not play a role in these difficulties or that trade policy is powerless.
In fact, despite China’s significant progress toward trade liberalization, 
which began well before its accession to the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) in 2001 (Ianchovichina & Martin, 2004), LAC’s exporters still face 
significant barriers to penetrating the Chinese market, which are particularly 
binding for natural resource–intensive sectors, where LAC has strong 
comparative advantages and where diversification is more likely to occur. 
Even more worrying is the fact that the relevance of these barriers often 
increases with the levels of processing and sophistication of the exports.
Do tariffs still matter?
A brief overview of the current structure of China’s import tariffs, shown 
in Table 1, leaves little doubt that agriculture should be at the top of LAC’s 
bilateral trade agenda. The average tariff for agriculture is significantly higher 
Average applied MFN tariff (%) Total Agriculture Manufacturing Mining
Simple average (6-dig) 9.9 13.4 9.3 3.2
Average weighted by
Chinese imports 4.6 10.3 5.4 1
Argentina’s exports to WLD 14.4 17.3 13.1 1.7
Brazil’s exports to WLD 10.1 17 9.2 0.8
Colombia’s exports to WLD 4.1 12.3 9.5 1.4
Mexico’s exports to WLD 9.6 16.1 10.9 0.7
World’s exports to WLD 8 16.1 8.5 2.4
Source: tariffs from WTO, trade data from UN-Comtrade, 2013. 
Note: Broad sectoral categories defined based on Standard International Trade Classification (SITC), 
Rev. 3. Manufacturing includes 1, 25, 266, 267, 269, 5, 61 to 67, 69, 7 and 8. Agriculture includes 0, 21, 
22, 233, 24, 261, 263, 264, 265, 268, 29 and 4. Mining includes 27, 28, 3 and 68.
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than those for the other sectors, with tariff peaks as high as 65 percent. Not 
only are tariffs higher, they are particularly stacked against LAC exports. With 
the exception of Colombia, the weighted average based on the composition 
of LAC’s exports to the world is significantly higher than either the simple 
average or the weighted average based on China’s current imports.
Tariffs on manufacturing goods are not as high as in agriculture, but they 
are far from harmless and are particularly at odds with China’s comparative 
and competitive advantages and its status as “the world factory.” The simple 
average is more than twice as high as that of the OECD (3.6 percent), and 
tariff peaks can be as high as 45 percent. LAC’s manufacturing exports 
also tend to face tariffs that in general are higher than the simple average, 
although the bias is not as strong as in the case of agriculture.
Although revealing, average applied tariffs do not tell the whole 
story, particularly in the light of the complexities of China’s trade regime. 
As with other East Asian economies in the past, processing trade plays a 
major role in China’s dealings with the rest of the world. Imports to the 
country face radically different levels of protection depending on their 
end use (such as intermediate, capital or consumer goods) and their final 
destination. Goods imported to be processed and re-exported enjoy zero 
tariffs, which are mostly made up of (manufacturing) intermediate goods. 
Estimates from 2010 put processing imports at 45 percent of all imports—a 
number that is significantly higher when commodity imports are excluded.1 
What this means in practice is that if a country exports goods that are 
part of China’s exporting value chain, it can take advantage of duty-free 
access to a market that is currently valued at US$447 billion for processing 
imports. Unfortunately, this is not the case for Latin American exporters, 
who export a limited amount of manufacturing goods to China (2 percent 
of all LAC’s manufacturing exports in 2014 or just 1.6 percent of all China’s 
manufacturing imports), 35 percent of which are made up of consumer 
and capital goods. Recent estimates are hard to come by, but data from 
China Customs Administration for 2006 indicates that in that year only 25 
percent of imports from LAC were considered “processing imports” and 
therefore enjoyed duty-free status.
If exporters are targeting the domestic market, which, as suggested, is 
the overwhelming case of Latin American exporters, then applied average 
tariffs tend to under—rather than overestimate the amount of protection 
they face. The reasons are related to how tariffs vary along the value chain; 
the way some imports are taxed and the incidence of non-tariff barriers.1 Yu & Tian, 2012.
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Higher obstacles at the top of the value chain. China’s tariff structure tends 
to discriminate against non-processing imports at the top of the value chain. 
This can be seen in at least two ways. As Figure 1 shows, the average most 
favored nation (MFN) tariff for consumer goods (11.1 percent) is twice that 
of intermediate goods (4.9 percent) and 10 times that of raw materials 
(1.1 percent). Whereas this bias is far from unique—it exists in most countries—
it is particularly pronounced in China’s case, with consumer goods having 
one of the highest levels of protection in the world. This feature certainly 
poses a challenge to LAC’s exporters seeking to sell directly to Chinese 
consumers, a privilege that usually carries higher profit margins.
This bias is also visible at finer levels of aggregation, along the lines 
of what is traditionally called tariff escalation; that is, import duties that 
increase according to the level of processing, irrespective of the end use 
of the good. This is particularly the case for agriculture, where processed 
FIGURE 1/
China’s import 
tariffs by end-use 
categories, 2014
Source: Iberoamerican Federation of Exchanges.
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goods face significantly higher tariffs than unprocessed goods. Here too, 
China is not alone in adopting this practice, with LAC’s other key trade 
partners having even more significant distortions (Figure 2).
Figure 3 takes a closer look at these practices by selecting nine 
value chains, which account for 90 percent of LAC’s exports to China and 
Source: IDB/INT with data from TRAINS and WITS.
Note: Goods defined according to Broad Economic Category: Food and Beverages.
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for 63 percent of its exports to the world. This breakdown reveals that 
tariff escalation mostly matters for soybeans and coffee, and, to a lesser 
extent, for paper pulp, even though China is competitive in pulp paper and 
processed soybeans and does not have a significant coffee industry.2 In 
contrast, sugar and maize do not show any sign of tariff escalation—in fact, 
the latter even show signs of “de-escalation”—a characteristic that seems 
to be driven by the tariff quotas imposed at the bottom of value chain (see 
section on non-tariff barriers, NTBs).
Tariff escalation might also be a concern for LAC metal exporters. 
While the region is one of the largest exporters of mineral ores to China, 
it exports hardly any processed minerals. For example, for every dollar of 
mineral ore exported in 2014, LAC was only able to export 47 cents of 
processed minerals.3 As shown in Figure 4, China has the second-highest 
tariff wedge across the value chain (2.6 percentage points) among LAC’s 
main metal importers.
Figure 5 takes a more detailed look at the value chain for LAC’s 
main metal exports. Reasons for concern mainly lie in the iron segment, 
regarding both the level of tariffs on processed products (8 percent) and 
the tariff wedge (8 percent), and, to a lesser extent, in the value chain for 
lead and aluminum. It is not so much of an issue for copper or zinc.
As in the case of some agricultural goods, defensive interests do not 
seem to justify the kind of tariff escalation seen in the value chain for iron. 
For example, China is the largest steel producer in the world with outputs 
FIGURE 4/
Tariff escalation for 
selected metals: 
China and selected 
countries, 2014
2 According to a LAC pulp 
paper association, China is 
the third largest exporter of 
paper to the world and to 
LAC, with 9.4 percent and 6 
percent of the market share, 
respectively.
3 Mineral ore is defined 
as HS-2 digit 26, and 
processed minerals as HS-2 
digit 72–80.
Source: IDB/INT with data from TRAINS and WITS.
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Chile’s sales of refined copper are the only processed metal exported by LAC to China. 
The country is not only the largest exporter in the region but also in the world, and 
31 percent of its exports go to China. This performance runs counter to the view that LAC 
is not competitive in processed metals and raises the question of how Chile is able to 
access the Chinese market. The reasons behind this puzzle are threefold.
First, there is a structural shortage in the domestic supply of refined copper. Even 
though China was able to ramp up its domestic smelter and refinery capacity to 4.4 MT 
and 7.9 MT, respectively, in 2013, consumption has outpaced this, reaching 9 MT (USGS, 
2013). The power sector is the main driver behind the refined copper market in China, 
accounting for 47 percent of total apparent consumption, followed by household appliances 
(15 percent), transportation (10 percent) and construction (9 percent) (USGS, 2013). 
China’s push for urbanization requires more power transmission capacity and positively 
affects sales of household appliances. China’s state-owned power sector enterprise, State 
Grid, currently plays a decisive role in the market, accounting for 40 percent of China’s 
total refined copper consumption (Fickling, 2016).
Second, the Chile–China FTA gives advantages to Chilean exporters. As Chile’s 
main refined copper producer, CODELCO (Corporación Nacional del Cobre) is able to 
export refined copper to China under a tariff-free regime, while India, Australia and Japan 
have to pay a 0.2 percent tariff. This small gap is enough for Chile to be competitive 
in terms of price after tariffs. In 2013, Chile’s refined copper unit price after tariffs was 
US$7,508 per ton, 1.1 percent lower than the average unit price from its main competitors.
Third, the high quality of Chile’s cathodes matters. CODELCO was able to certify 
their cathodes in China and to prove that they are superior to the local supply, allowing 
the company to win contracts with key suppliers such as State Grid (CODELCO, 2010).
FIGURE 5/
Tariff escalation for 
selected metals: 
LAC’s main exports 
to China, 2014
Source: IDB/INT with data from TRAINS and WITS.
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4 See http://fta.mofcom.
gov.cn/topic/encosta.shtml. 
China’s other signed FTAs 
are with ASEAN, Pakistan, 
New Zealand, Singapore, 
Hong kong, Macau, Iceland, 
Switzerland, korea and 
Australia.
of 803 million metric tons in 2015, accounting for 49 percent of the world’s 
production (World Steel Association, 2015).
Tariffs and trade diversion. Aside from the issue of the level and structure 
of China’s tariff protection, LAC exporters have to contend with increasing 
negative trade preferences, driven by China’s growing network of trade 
agreements. As of October 2015, China had 13 free trade agreements 
(FTAs), only three of which were with LAC—Chile (2005), Peru (2009) and 
Costa Rica (2011)—and was negotiating another seven.4 Figure 6 illustrates 
these concerns, showing that in end-use categories, the tariffs imposed on 
LAC companies is approximately twice those facing China’s FTA partners. 
The disadvantages, as would be expected, are significantly smaller for the 
three LAC countries with FTAs mentioned above, but they are still sizeable 
for consumer goods.
FIGURE 6/
China’s tariffs by 
FTA and product 
clusters, 2013
Source: IDB/INT with data from Comtrade and TRAINS.
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How much do tariffs hurt LAC exports? While the evidence presented so 
far suggests that tariffs are still an important hurdle for LAC exporters, 
nothing has been said about exactly how much they hurt the region’s 
exports or, to put it another way, how much could be gained by a more 
aggressive trade policy.
To answer this type of question, trade economists usually resort to 
two types of tools: computable general equilibrium and gravity models. The 
former offers what may potentially be a more complete answer because it 
takes into account first- and second-order impacts on all product and factor 
markets. However, it demands a massive amount of data, which is not usually 
available for the whole region, and the results are too dependent on arbitrary 
assumptions about the way the economy works. The gravity model, in turn, is 
less data intensive, robust to different assumptions and has a proven record 
of reliably predicting bilateral trade flows. The intuition behind it is simple: 
bilateral trade is directly proportional to the GDPs of trade partners and is 
inversely proportional to the geographical and cultural distances between 
them. Deviations from this norm are attributed to trade costs or frictions 
such as tariffs and NTBs.5
This study uses the simplicity and accuracy of the gravity model 
in an attempt to give a more precise answer about the impact of China’s 
tariffs on LAC exports. Unlike the traditional gravity approach, which 
looks only at aggregated bilateral flows, the model used here is run at the 
partner-product level (Harmonized System, 4-digits) to better capture the 
significant sectoral variation in Chinese tariffs. The details of the exercise 
and its results are discussed in the Technical Appendix; the focus here is on 
a simulation that illustrates the mains finding.
Rather than use the proverbial zero-tariff scenario, the simulation 
is based on something more realistic: a cut in China’s tariffs on LAC’s 
agricultural and manufacturing exports which bring them to OECD levels. 
Mining products are not included since tariffs are already low, on average. 
Figure 7 illustrates the magnitude of the cut by comparing the tariff 
distribution faced by LAC exporters in the two markets for the categories 
in question. China’s median tariff is approximately twice that of the OECD 
for agricultural goods and more than three times for manufacturing goods.
Figure 8 presents the results of the simulation based on a model 
specification that tries to balance the needs to control for “unobservables” 
that might bias results (such as product and country idiosyncrasies) and 
to have enough variation in the data to be able to identify impacts. As can 
5 See, for example, Head & 
Thierry, 2014.
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be seen, the median impact on exports from both categories is significant, 
reaching 53 percent in agriculture and 46.5 percent in manufacturing. In 
both cases, though, there is significant variance across products. Leaving 
outliers aside, the increase in agricultural exports ranges from 26 percent 
to 82 percent, and that of manufacturing goods from 26 percent to 
69 percent. Overall, agricultural exports would grow by 9.6 percent and 
those of manufacturing goods would reach 37.4 percent. These are exactly 
the type of gains that policymakers literally cannot leave lying on the table.
Beyond tariffs: Taxation and subsidies for agriculture
As mentioned earlier, the barriers that LAC exporters face when accessing 
the Chinese market go well beyond tariffs and involve other forms of 
protection. Tax policies and subsidies are some of these less visible but no 
Source: IDB/INT with data from WITS.
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less effective barriers, particularly for agricultural goods. Taxation stands 
out in terms of both its low visibility and its impact on exports.
The extra protection arises mostly from the way the value added tax 
(VAT) is levied on local and imported goods, a practice that has its roots 
in a fiscal reform implemented in the early 1990s.6 The reform has granted 
farmers a number of VAT exemptions, including the 13 percent tax on the sale 
of their products to wholesalers. Since, despite WTO regulations pointing 
to the contrary, this exemption was not extended to imports, exporters face 
a significantly higher tax burden—a VAT wedge—which varies according to 
the peculiarities of the product’s value chain and the level of processing.7 
Products at the bottom of the value chain, such as unprocessed grains 
and soybeans, face the full 13 percentage point discrimination. The impact 
is lower for processed products, such as meat and dairy, since local food 
processors are required to pay taxes on their value added.8
To give a clearer picture of how much more protection this VAT wedge 
adds to tariffs, Figure 9 presents estimates for some of LAC’s most important 
commodity exports. On average, the VAT wedge raises protection by as much 
as 73 percent, led by soybeans, whose nominal protection rises from 1.5 percent 
(import tariff) to 13.2 percent (tariff plus the VAT wedge). As shown in the tariff 
simulation discussed in the previous sections, this extra protection can easily 
translate into billions of dollars of foregone revenue for exporters, given that 
the demand for these commodities are generally very price sensitive.
Source: IDB/INT with data from WITS.
Note: This figure presents the distribution of the impacts at the partner-4-digit HS level covering all 
26 LAC countries. The median of the impacts is given by the line subdividing the boxes. The bottom 
and upper hinges of the boxes are, respectively, the first and third quartile of the distribution. The 
whiskers represent the maximum and minimum impacts within 1.5 times the distance between the 
first and third quartile. The outliers beyond this range were not plotted. The simulation is based on 
a global sectoral gravity model with fixed effects, as described in the Technical Appendix (Table A1, 
specification 2). See Table 1 for category definitions. Data is for 2013.
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6 See Huang, Rozelle, & 
Chang, 2004. The first 
regulation governing VAT 
on agricultural products 
was the “Interim Regulation 
on the VAT of the People’s 
Republic of China” of 
December 13, 1993. It was 
replaced on November 10, 
2008, without significant 
changes, by Decree No. 538.
7 See Article III of GATT 
for regulations concerning 
the application of domestic 
taxes to imports.
8 Even though wholesalers 
and processors do not pay 
the 13 percent VAT on local 
farm products, they can 
deduct this amount from 
the taxes they pay when 
they sell their products. 
VAT is 13 percent for “first 
stage processed” products 
(e.g., unprocessed grains, 
fruits and soybeans) and 17 
percent for “value-added 
processed products” (e.g., 
dairy and potato products). 
See (USDA, 2007)for a 
detailed explanation of the 
“effective” VAT taxes along 
the agricultural value chain.
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Even though the VAT wedge is about foregone revenue and not 
expenditure, it falls under the category of agricultural subsidies as defined 
by the WTO Agreement on Agriculture.9 It is not, however, the only 
agricultural subsidy LAC exporters should be worried about. The OECD, 
for instance, listed 24 active programs in China, ranging from payments 
based on input use to payments based on area, animals or income. They 
are estimated to have reached US$54.2 billion, or 4 percent of the country’s 
agricultural output, in 2014.10 This is substantial but considerably less than 
the revenue foregone under the VAT exemption, which may be as high as 
US$1.1 trillion or 13 percent of the agricultural output, assuming it is being 
fully implemented. These figures are particularly worrying given that part 
of China’s WTO accession commitment was to keep trade distorting (or 
“amber box”) agricultural subsidies under 8.5 percent of the output value.11
How relevant are non-tariff barriers?
As challenging as tariffs and subsidies can be, LAC exporters face an even 
tougher obstacle in dealing with NTBs, which, due to the different reasons 
underlying them, are divided here into two groups: technical and non-
technical measures. The former include basically regulatory barriers such as 
technical barriers to trade (TBTs) and sanitary and phytosanitary measures 
Source: IDB-INT with Tains data for tariffs and interviews and USDA 2007 for the VAT wedge.   
Note: VAT wedge is the difference between the effective VAT rates for domestic production and imports.
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Import tariffs and 
the VAT wedge
9 See Annex 3 of the 
agreement: https://
www. wto.org/spanish/
res_s/ booksp_s/analytic_ 
index_s/agriculture_02_s. 
htm#ann_3A1 
10 OECD Producer and 
Consumer Support Esti-
mates Database.  
https://www.oecd.org/
tad/agricultural-policies/
producerandconsumersup-
portestimatesdatabase.htm
11 See, for example, 
Brink, 2014. The National 
Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC), in 
a recent report on the 
implementation of the 2014 
Plan for National Economic 
and Social Development, 
acknowledges that “amber 
box” subsidies to agriculture 
“are close to the limit” (see 
NDRC, 2015).
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(SPS). The latter covers state trading, TRQs and price controls. As with the 
other barriers, agricultural goods are impacted more by NTBs than other 
goods and are therefore the focus of this analysis. There is enough evidence 
to suggest that NTBs have been growing in importance over the last decade, 
and have certainly overtaken tariffs as the biding constraint for a significant 
number of LAC agricultural exports.
Figure 10 offers an overview of this trend. Although China’s tariffs for 
agricultural goods experienced a sharp decline after the WTO accession, 
and subsidies (excluding the VAT wedge) have stabilized at around 4 
percent of agricultural output, the gap between domestic and international 
prices has grown almost exponentially since 2008, a change that can only 
be explained by other measures of government intervention. As of 2014, 
the average price gap was as high as 24 percent compared to an average 
tariff of 9.2 percent. Figure 11 offers a more detailed breakdown, with 
price gap and relevant NTB information on some of LAC’s most important 
commodity exports. As can be seen, beef, pork and poultry are the most 
affected goods, with price gaps that are much higher than their import 
tariffs. Mining products and sugar and cotton appear to face the opposite 
situation, but this seems to mainly be explained by stringent domestic price 
controls.
Source: IDB-INT with OECD (subsidies and nominal protection) and WTO (tariffs) data.  
Note: Nominal protection is the ratio between the average price received by producers at farm 
gate (including payments per ton of current output), and the border price (measured at farm gate).  
Subsidy (measured as a percentage of the value of output)  includes payments based on input use, 
area, income and non-commodity criteria. Payments based on output are estimated to be virtually 
zero for most goods (See OECD Producer and Consumer Support Estimates Database). MFN is the 
weighted average (China imports from the world) most favored nation applied tariff. 
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Non-technical measures
Over the last decade, China’s imports of a small, yet relevant group of 
agricultural commodities and raw materials have been regulated by state 
trading enterprises (STEs) and TRQs and have been subject to price 
controls. Imports of grains (wheat, rice and maize), sugar, fertilizers and 
cotton are controlled by STEs and have TRQs; imports of wool are only 
subject to TRQs; and imports of tobacco and crude and processed oil are 
controlled by STEs and do not have TRQs. Only crude oil and wool are not 
subject to any type of price control (see Table 2).12
These policies tend to harm LAC exports in at least three ways. First, 
state trading might allow STEs to behave as monopsonists, pushing down 
import prices. Second, whereas TRQs are less distortive than outright import 
bans or simple quotas, they still can cause heavy losses for exporters (and 
consumers) depending on how the intra- and extraquota tariffs are set, and on 
how the quotas (and rents) are distributed between importers and exporters 
and among export countries.13 Third, price controls may set domestic prices 
that are lower than the international level, discouraging imports.
Source: IDB/INT with data from UNCTAD TRAINS, NDRC Price Monitoring Center, Ministry of 
Agriculture and Comtrade.
Note: Price gap is the difference between domestic wholesale prices and international border prices. 
SPS are phytosanitary measures, TRQs are tariff-rate quotas, ST is state trading and Hk is used when 
Hong kong imports are used as a reference when there is an import ban in mainland China.
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12 See China’s notification to  
the WTO for more details:  
https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/ 
Pages/FE_Search/ 
DDFDocuments/22941/Q/G/ 
STR/N9CHNA1C1.pdf
13 See, for example, Li & 
Carter, 2009.
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Product Price control
TQ quantity 
(tons)
Out of  
quota rates
In quota 
rates
TQR allocated to  
STE in 2014 STE
Wheat minimum procurement 
price scheme
9,636,000 65% 1–10% 90% COFCO – China National Cereals, Oil and 
Foodstuff Import and Export Co. (Group)
Maize reserves set at market 
prices
7,200,000 20–65% 1–10% 60% COFCO – China National Cereals, Oil and 
Foodstuff Import and Export Co. (Group)
Rice minimum procurement 
price scheme
5,320,000 10–65% 1–15% 50% COFCO – China National Cereals, Oil and 
Foodstuff Import and Export Co. (Group)
Sugar temporary price 
program
1,945,000 50% 15% 70% COFCO – China National Cereals, Oil and 
Foodstuff Import and Export Co. (Group)
China National Export Bases Development Co.
China Sugar and Wine Co.(Group)
China Commerce Foreign Trade Co.
Fertilizers benchmark factory 
prices and fluctuations 
13,650,000 50% 4% 90% for urea 51% for 
NPK
51% for Diammonium 
phosphate N/A for the 
others
China National Chemicals Import and Export Co.
China National Agriculture Means of Production 
Group Co.
Cotton temporary price 
program
894,000 40% 1% 33% China National Textiles Import and Export Co.
China National Cotton Reserve Corporation
Beijing Jiu Da Textiles Group Co.
Tianjin Textiles Industry Supply and Marketing Co.
Shanghai Textiles Raw Materials Co.
TABLE 2/
China’s STE, 
TRQ and price 
control policy 
characteristics
(continued on next page)
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China’s STE, 
TRQ and price 
control policy 
characteristics
(continued)
Product Price control
TQ quantity 
(tons)
Out of  
quota rates
In quota 
rates
TQR allocated to  
STE in 2014 STE
Wool not applicable 287,000 38% 1–3% not regulated by this 
measure
not regulated by this measure
Tobacco price of tobacco is set 
at the central level
not  
applicable
not  
applicable
not applicable not applicable China National Tobacco Import and Export Co. 
(Group)
Crude oil not applicable not applicable not  
applicable
not applicable not applicable China National Chemicals Import and Export Co.
China International United Petroleum and 
Chemicals Co.
China National United Oil Co.
Zhu Hai Zhen Rong Company
Processed 
oil
determined on the 
basis of the price 
of crude oil on the 
international market 
plus the average 
processing fee, taxes 
and reasonable 
transportation fees in 
China
not  
applicable
not  
applicable
not  
applicable
not applicable China National Chemicals Import and Export Co. 
(all processed oil)
China International United Petroleum and 
Chemicals Co. (all processed oil)
China National United Oil Co. (all processed oil)
Zhu Hai Zhen Rong Company (all processed oil)
China Aviation Oil Import and Export Co. Ltd 
(Aviation kerosene)
64 other companies (fuel oil)
Source: IDB/INT based on China’s notifications to the WTO.
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Chinese STEs’ control over imports varies across products. In most 
cases, they only administer part of the TRQs, with the remainder being 
distributed to non-state trade importers, although without clear criteria for 
doing so. The only exceptions are tobacco, crude and processed oil. Four 
STEs have the right to import crude oil and 68 can do so for processed oil, 
while tobacco is the only case where one company has total control over 
the import market.14
Price controls are administered by both the central and provincial 
governments and prices are categorized as either “fixed” and “guided,” 
with the latter being allowed to float within a given range. In addition, the 
government may create different temporary price programs or reserve 
systems to support certain sectors.15
The TRQs are managed by the National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC) and by the Ministry of Commerce. Every year, both 
institutions issue a public call for companies interested in applying for quotas. 
The NDRC is responsible for grains and cotton and the Ministry of Commerce 
for sugar, fertilizers and wool. The allocation criteria are defined according to 
the number of applications, past import performance, production capacity 
and other relevant commercial standards. After companies apply to the 
program, the quotas are allocated according on a first-come, first-served 
basis. None of the calls determine a minimum quota amount that would be 
shared by each applicant. The call states that each company will be allocated 
its quota according to the analysis of the company’s import performance.16
As is the case with most TRQ regimes around the world, China’s 
quotas are mostly underutilized. The only exceptions are cotton, sugar 
and wool (see Figure 12). Whereas underutilization could be interpreted 
as evidence of a non-binding restriction, it might also be related to high 
in-quota tariffs and to the way the quotas are administered. In fact, some 
of China’s trade partners with agricultural interests have raised concerns 
about “opaque management practices,” particularly in terms of quota 
amounts and their recipients.17
To determine exactly how much damage these practices have been 
causing LAC’s export interests would require a complex and rigorous 
empirical analysis, which is beyond the scope of this report. A detailed 
analysis of China’s price and import dynamics for two of LAC’s most important 
commodities—cotton and sugar—may help to shed some light on this issue.
China’s cotton imports have been systematically above the quota 
threshold, despite the punitive 40 percent out-of-quota tariff, reflecting 
14 Out-of-quota cotton 
imports may be subject to 
a sliding-scale tariff which 
fluctuates according to 
a formula based on the 
international price, but may 
never exceed the 40 percent 
ad valorem duty ceiling.
15 For details see 中华人民
共和国价格法 (Price Law of 
the People’s Republic of 
China) and 国家计委和国务
院有关部门定价目录 (State 
Planning Commission and 
State Council departments’ 
pricing catalogue, 2001)
16  For more detailed 
information about China’s 
TRQ policy, see 农产品进口关
税配额管理暂行办法 (Interim 
measures for import tariff 
quotas for agricultural 
products).
17 See, for example, USTR, 
2014.
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the local industry’s lack of competitiveness. More recently, these imports 
experienced a boom as a result of the minimum purchase price program 
launched in May 2011, amid a significant drop in cotton prices.18 The program 
has widened the gap between domestic and international prices, leading 
the government to accumulate huge reserves—60 percent of the world 
cotton reserves in 2014, according to the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) as spinning mills turned to the much cheaper and better quality 
imported cotton (see Figures 13 and 14).
Ironically, this greater distortion introduced by the price support 
program has been instrumental in showing the potential that LAC cotton 
Source: IDB/INT with data from Comtrade, China’s Ministry of Commerce and NDRC.
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Source: IDB/INT with data from USDA.
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18 The price program was 
an initiative launched by the 
NDRC alongside the Ministry 
of Commerce, the Ministry 
of Finance and five other 
ministries. For details on the 
regulation, see 发改委等联合
发布今年起实行棉花临时收储
制度 (NDRC has established 
this year’s temporary cotton 
storage to implement the 
system).
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exports have in China or how much they have been hampered by TRQs. 
As shown in Figure 15, imports from LAC took off after the price support 
program was introduced, particularly those from Brazil and Mexico. The 
numbers jumped from US$103 million in 2008 to US$984 in 2012, nearly 
tripling their market share to 8.3 percent. The boom, however, was short-
lived, as in 2014 the government started to sell their bloated state reserves 
through public auctions, incurring in deep losses.19 The International Cotton 
Advisory Committee forecast that the auctions, and import limitations, will 
shrink Chinese cotton stocks by 7 percent in 2015–16, and by a further 10 
percent in 2016–17, negatively impacting imports from the world that have 
tended to decline by 6–8 percent during this period (ICAC, 2016).
19 Ministry of Finance, 
2015. This process appears 
to have been far from 
smooth, with the auctions 
facing price and quality 
issues—see, for example, 
Hornby, 2014 and China 
Cotton Association, 
2014. For example, an 
auction organized by 
the Xinjiang Production 
and Construction Corp in 
August 2014 offered 12,322 
tons of cotton and only 
resulted in the sale of 708 
tons (5.7 percent of the 
total offer) due to the poor 
quality of the cotton.
Source: IDB/INT with data from Comtrade, NDRC Price Monitoring Center and CEIC.
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Sugar exports face a similar scenario with TRQs, state trading and 
price interventions; except for in this case there is a floating price range 
at the provincial level as a well as interventions in the price of inputs, with 
the government requesting that local sugar mills purchase sugarcane at a 
guidance price.20 As with cotton, these policies have been keeping domestic 
prices higher than the international level, particularly in the last five years 
(Figure 16), when the widening gap between domestic and import prices 
and booming domestic demand have boosted imports beyond the quota 
threshold, despite the punitive tariffs (Figure 17).
Source: IDB/INT with data from USDA.
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20 A USTR report (USTR, 
2013) lists the data for the 
last three years, which varies 
from RMB400 to RMB500 
per ton (US$0.95–1.05 
per kg), according to the 
province. Other articles from 
different localities indicate 
that the price ranged from 
5 percent to 7 percent (湛
江：第二期甘蔗指导价每吨
440元 – Zhanjiang: Phase II, 
guidance price set at 440 
yuan per ton of sugarcane; 
关于做好2013跨2014年榨季甘
蔗收购价格管理工作的通知 湛
价〔2013〕172号 – Chamber 
of Commerce announces 
2014 sugarcane price based 
on the 2013 harvest).
Source: IDB/INT with data from Comtrade, Zhengzhou Commodity Exchange (ZCE), NDRC Price 
Monitoring Center and CEIC.
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Here too, there is a significant increase in government stocks of 
expensive local products and a sharp response from LAC exports. These 
increased by nearly a factor of 10 between 2008 and 2013, driven mainly 
by exports from Brazil and, to a lesser extent, Guatemala, which had barely 
exported to China before.21 Here, too, this boom might be short-lived as 
the government moved to start unloading its stocks at heavy losses in 
2014 and changed its price support policy to rely more on direct subsidies 
to sugarcane farmers.22 The first quarter in 2016 has already seen record 
declines in sugar imports, with a 39 percent drop in comparison to 2015.
These experiences regarding cotton and sugar leave no doubt as to 
the region’s capacity to respond promptly to opportunities in China once 
price and quantitative distortion are removed. The magnitude of these 
responses under very uncertain and distorted policy conditions underscores 
this claim. Both sides of the relationship—that is, consumers and taxpayers 
in China and producers in LAC—seem to have a lot to gain from a move 
toward freer markets without NTBs or government support.
21 During this period, China 
overtook the U.S. to become 
the main destination of 
Guatemala’s sugar exports. 
It is worth mentioning that 
Mexico and El Salvador, 
two of LAC’s largest sugar 
producers, do not export 
to China. In both cases, 
the U.S. offers a higher 
price for their exports in 
comparison to China. For 
example, China’s average 
import price from the world 
in 2013 was US$455 per 
ton, while the U.S. imported 
sugar from Mexico and El 
Salvador the same year for 
US$495 and US$469 per 
ton, respectively.
22 For more information, 
see 云南下发蔗糖产业振兴3
年行动计划 到2015年云南要
建25个国家级糖料基地 (In 
2015, the Yunnan sugar 
industry issued a three-
year action plan to revitalize 
the industry by building 25 
national sugar bases) and 
加大政策性甘蔗保险宣传 力
争完成甘蔗投保任务 (Policy 
to increase insurance for 
sugarcane production so as 
to protect and promote the 
sugarcane industry).
Source: IDB/INT with data from Comtrade and USDA.
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Technical (regulatory) measures
Whereas non-technical measures such as TRQs have the unambiguous 
objective of protecting local producers and keeping imports out, technical 
measures such as TBTs and SPS are supposed to pursue legitimate policy 
objectives, such as the protection of human health and safety, or protection 
of the environment. In practice, though, they can be discriminatory and 
create unnecessary obstacles to trade. Whether or not this is the case 
is an empirical question. The data does not suggest that LAC is unfairly 
targeted by these measures, but since the regulatory effort—in China and 
elsewhere—is mostly concentrated in agriculture and mining and since 
LAC’s exports are so heavily concentrated in these sectors, the region is 
more likely to pay the costs of such measures. That much can be seen 
in Figure 18, which shows that imports from South America, along other 
commodity-export regions, are more extensively affected; and in Figure 19, 
which makes it clear that this exposure comes from agriculture (or food-
related manufacturing) and mining.
A review of the existing regulations and interviews with LAC exporters 
suggests that most of the difficulties are concentrated in agricultural 
exports and mostly relate to opaque SPS rules and long and uncertain waits 
FIGURE 18/
Share of China’s 
imports subjected 
to at least one 
technical measure: 
by origin, 
2011–14 average, 
percentages.
Source: IDB-INT with data from China’s General Administration of Customs.
Note: The coverage measure is based on the compilation of  technical measures (TM) at the tariff line, 
agregrated at the six digits of the Harmonized System. Each six digit is considered affected if there is 
at least one tariff line subjeted to TMs.
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to get products certified. China’s SPS regulation is governed by a myriad of 
laws and agencies,23 three of which have been particularly costly for LAC 
exporters: the China Food Safety Law, the Law on the Entry and Exit of 
Animals and Plant Quarantine and the Regulations on the Administration 
of Agricultural Genetically Modified Organisms Safety.
The Food Safety Law, issued by the Ministry of Health, oversees SPS 
guidelines for food production, domestic trade and imports, which have to 
be inspected and approved before entering the Chinese market.24 The Law 
on the Entry and Exit of Animals and Plant Quarantine establishes how the 
government should inspect and approve imports (including the farms and 
processing plants they originate from) and how to quarantine and ban them 
in case of confirmed diseases. It is enforced by the General Administration 
of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine (AQSIQ).25 Lastly, the 
Regulations on the Administration of Agricultural Genetically Modified 
Organisms Safety controls food imports that are made up or contain 
genetically modified organisms (GMOs), which are supposed to obtain a 
technical certification—detailed by the Ministry of Agriculture—from the 
AQSIQ.
23 See WTO, 2014.
24 The annex to the law 
specifies the international 
and domestic food 
standards for imported 
products by tariff line. For 
details, see 国家质量监督检验
检疫总局 卫生部《关于进口食
品、食品添加剂检验》2009年
第72号 (State Administration 
of Quality Supervision, 
Inspection and Quarantine, 
Ministry of Health, “Testing 
for imported food and food 
additives,” 2009, No. 72).
25 The law also states that 
every year AQSIQ has 
to post a catalogue of 
products that are subject 
to entry inspection. See, 
for example, the 2014 
catalogue: 关于实施2014
年《出入境检验检疫机构实
施检验检疫的进出境商品目
录》有关问题的通知 (Notice 
on issues relating to the 
implementation of the 2014 
“Entry and exit inspection 
and quarantine catalogue”).
Source: IDB-INT with data from China’s General Administration of Customs.
Note: The coverage measure is based on the compilation of technical measures (TM) at the tariff line, 
agregrated at the six digits of the Harmonized System. Each six digit is considered affected if there is 
at least one tariff line subjeted to TMs.
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Share of China’s 
imports subjected 
to at least one 
technical measure: 
by industry and 
origin, 2014, 
percentages.
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LAC’s exports seem to be particularly hobbled by AQSIQ’s lengthy 
and sometimes opaque process of approval of processing plants and GMOs 
and by SPS measures that are often stricter than international standards. 
This has been particularly the case for meat, soybeans and maize exports, 
which are discussed in more detail in the following paragraphs.26
Meats. AQSIQ’s lengthy approval process has been of special relevance 
for meat exports, the processing plants for which have to be certified. The 
process starts with both governments signing a sanitary protocol, assuring 
that only processing plants registered, supervised and controlled by the 
veterinary and sanitary systems of the resident country are eligible to export 
to China. In addition, foreign government institutions are responsible for 
coordinating the approval process with the Certification and Accreditation 
Administration (CNCA)—which operates under AQSIQ—which involves an 
official visit from CNCA’s technicians to assess the exporting company’s 
production and storage processes on-site. Even when approved, exports are 
still subjected to AQSIQ entry inspections. The only exception to the plant 
approval rule are U.S. meat exports, exempted by a bilateral agreement, 
which clearly puts LAC producers at disadvantage.27
As of March 2016, AQSIQ had approved 248 processing plants for 
pork, 111 for poultry and 146 for beef in foreign countries. At first glance, 
these numbers suggest that China is particularly strict over the approval of 
beef and poultry establishments. In the last four years, an annual average 
of 5.5 new poultry plants and 9.25 new beef plants received permission to 
export. In contrast, an average of 23 new plants per year are added to the 
pork segment (see Figure 20).
The fact that the U.S. does not need to have its plants approved by 
the AQSIQ makes it difficult to have a clear picture of how export capacity 
is distributed among different countries. Nevertheless, the data suggest 
that LAC has a significant presence in poultry, accounting for more than 70 
percent of the approved non-U.S. establishments; a moderate 44 percent 
share in beef and a small role in pork, with only 10 percent of the approved 
plants.
Figure 20 also indicates how difficult it is for LAC countries to expand 
their number of exporting plants, although there is significant heterogeneity 
across countries. In 2016, Brazil managed to add the most—15 poultry, eight 
beef and six pork plants—but its total approved plants—40 poultry, 16 beef 
and 12 pork plants—still represent a fraction of its production capacity.
26 In Circular No. 49 from 
the State Council (Several 
opinions of the state council 
on strengthening imports), 
the Chinese government 
acknowledges that AQSIQ 
should speed up its 
approval process. For more 
details, see 商务部解读国办
关于加强进口的若干意见, 国办
发[2014]49 号 (Ministry of 
Commerce’s interpretation 
of the State Council’s 
opinions on strengthening 
imports).
27 According to the 1999 
Agreement on U.S.–China 
Agricultural Cooperation, 
the Chinese government 
recognized that the U.S. 
has a sound system of 
epidemiological disease 
control and accepted that 
the USDA Food Safety 
Inspection Service would 
be in charge of approving 
establishments to export to 
China.
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28 The anti-dumping and 
countervailing duties were 
adopted in February and 
October 2010, respectively. 
The anti-dumping duty was 
53.4 percent for companies 
that responded to the 
investigation and 105 percent 
for the others, while the 
countervailing duty was 12.5 
percent and 30.3 percent, 
respectively. After a WTO 
decision in favor of the U.S., 
the Ministry of Commerce 
lowered the anti-dumping 
duty to 46.6 percent for 
companies that responded 
to the investigation and 
to 73.8 percent for all 
other companies. The 
countervailing duties were 
also cut to 4.0 percent and 
4.2 percent, respectively. For 
details, see WTO-DS427: 
China—Anti-Dumping 
and Countervailing Duty 
Measures on Broiler Products 
from the United States.
It is not clear how binding these capacity constraints have been for 
LAC exports. Figure 21 shows that there is not a clear correlation between 
meat exports and the number of plants approved, suggesting that there 
are other supply, demand and regulatory factors at play. In the case of 
poultry, for instance, prices seem to be a major impediment as they have 
been systematically higher than those of U.S. exports and higher than the 
domestic wholesale price after accounting for VAT and (specific) import 
tariffs (Figure 22). The levy of anti-dumping and countervailing duties on 
U.S. exports in 2010 helped LAC to narrow and, in some cases, close the 
price gap with the U.S., prompting a boom in LAC exports (Figure 23).28 But 
that would not have been possible if Brazil had not had its initial batch of 
plants approved in December 2009.
The constraints imposed by plant certification can perhaps be seen 
more clearly in the volume of LAC exports that reach China via Hong Kong, 
which has a free trade agreement with the mainland, in an attempt to evade 
SPS controls. As is shown in Figure 24, Brazil’s exports to China caught up 
with those to Hong Kong after a critical mass of plants were certified in 
2009, but export volumes to the two markets have remained similar since 
then despite the huge difference in size between them. This seems to reflect 
the fact that only 40 of the 61 plants that have applied for certification have 
been successful (Hugueney & Soares, 2014). This sort of triangulation can 
Source: IDB/INT with data from AQSIQ Meat products inspection and quarantine access list, July 
reports (肉类产品检验检疫准入名单).
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Source: IDB/INT with data from Comtrade (trade) and AQSIQ (plants).
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29 Argentina’s exports to 
Hong kong increased by a 
factor of four after China 
suspended eight Argentine 
export plants in March 2013. 
Likewise, Chile’s exports 
to Hong kong increased 
by a factor of seven in 
September 2013 after their 
exports to the mainland 
were suspended based on 
the presence of a forbidden 
chemical (dioxin) in their 
shipments (IDB-INT with 
data from Comtrade).
also be observed in Argentina’s and Chile’s poultry exports when facing 
SPS barriers.29
Although effective, the Hong Kong route comes with a hefty cost 
attached to it. The use of a middleman raises transaction costs, forcing 
Source: IDB-INT with COMTRADE, USDA and Ministry of Agriculture data.
Note: Import prices are based on average unit values. See footnote 28 for definitions of U.S prices. 
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LAC companies to export for significantly lower prices. From 2013 to 
2014, for instance, LAC export prices to Hong Kong were on average 60 
percent lower than those of LAC exports to China and 39 percent lower 
than wholesale prices in the mainland, suggesting that a considerable 
share of the rents were being appropriated by intermediaries.30,31
The difficulties in plant certification seem to be particularly costly for 
LAC beef exporters. Countries such as Australia and New Zealand, which 
already enjoy locational advantages, have the bulk of China’s certified 
beef processing plants (45 and 40, respectively) and are capturing most 
of this booming market (Figure 25), which is still mostly supplied by 
local producers despite their low productivity.32 Among LAC’s potential 
exporters only Uruguay and Argentina—with 24 and 26 approved plants, 
respectively—do not seem to be bound by plant constraints. The latter, 
in particular, is likely to be more constrained by domestic than Chinese 
trade policy (Regúnaga & Tejeda Rodriguez, 2015). Brazilian exports 
started to pick up at the end of 2015, when the Chinese government lifted 
the ban on Brazilian beef. Exports are estimated at US$517 million for 
2015, positioning Brazil as one of the main beef suppliers to the Chinese 
market.
Apart from the low volume of LAC’s exports—despite proven 
comparative advantages—there are two other important signs that China’s 
Source: IDB-INT with COMTRADE-data.
* HS-6 020714, cuts and offal, frozen.
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30 IDB-INT with data from 
Comtrade, China’s Ministry 
of Agriculture and USDA.
31 Aside from the issues 
plant certification, LAC’s 
poultry exports also face 
SPS standards that are often 
stricter than in the rest of 
the world. For instance, 
exports are supposed to 
have no traces of salmonella, 
a common group of bacteria 
in raw food and one of the 
most common causes of 
food illness in the world. This 
zero tolerance seems to go 
beyond scientific advice and 
is not commonly adopted 
elsewhere in the world (see, 
for example, USDA, 2013b.
32 As of 2014, imports 
were just 6 percent of 
domestic consumption 
(USDA). See Rabobank, 
2014 for an analysis of the 
competitiveness of local 
producers.
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beef imports face substantial SPS capacity constraints. First, domestic 
wholesale prices have been systematically above import prices (including 
VAT and tariffs)—indeed, as of April 2015, there was an astonishing 
44 percent price gap between the two.33 Second, as with poultry, the Hong 
Kong route has been widely used, particularly by Brazil, whose exports 
were suspended in 2012 over a controversial case of bovine spongiform 
encephalopathy (BSE).34 Since 2009, Brazil’s exports to Hong Kong have 
been consistently higher than the combined amount of China’s imports 
from its main suppliers: Australia and New Zealand.
As mentioned earlier, the Hong Kong route is a costly alternative 
to direct access to the mainland. For instance, between May 2010 and 
December 2013, for every kilogram of beef exported to Hong Kong, LAC 
exporters forewent the opportunity to earn, on average, an additional 
US$0.24, which would add up to US$110 million in exports to the mainland.35
LAC pork exporters face a similar situation to their counterparts 
in the poultry and beef industries: an incipient, booming import 
market—which still accounts for only 2 percent of domestic sales in 
2014—fueled by the lack of competitiveness of local producers and fast-
growing consumption, but which remains largely out of reach because 
of the low numbers of certified plants. As is the case with beef, domestic 
prices have been consistently higher than those of imports, despite 
sizable import tariffs and VAT exemptions (Figure 26). An important 
Source: IDB-INT with COMTRADE data.
* HS-6 020714, cuts and offal, frozen.
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33 IDB-INT with data from 
Comtrade, Ministry of 
Agriculture of China and 
USDA.
34 Also known as mad cow 
disease. In 2013, the World 
Organization for Animal 
Health (OIE) recognized 
that it was an unconfirmed 
case and maintained 
Brazil’s status as having 
a negligible BSE risk (see 
Resolution No. 18, 82nd 
General Session, May 2014).
35 IDB-INT with data from 
Comtrade, Ministry of 
Agriculture of China and 
USDA.
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36 For an analysis of 
China’s pork industry, see 
Rabobank, 2012.
difference in this case is market size: the consumption of pork per capita 
in China is 42 kg per year, in comparison with 9.8 kg for poultry and 
4.5 kg for beef (USDA, 2013).36
Among LAC countries, only Brazil, Chile and, more recently, Mexico 
have pork plants approved for export to China. Together, these total only 
26 plants, or 11 percent of the total, which, as shown in Figure 27, translates 
into a very limited share of pork imports. A major SPS constraint seems to 
Source: IDB-INT with COMTRADE and China’s Ministry of Agriculture data. 
Note: Import prices are based on average unit values.
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be China’s ban of the use of ractopamine, a feed additive that reduces fat 
content (Mike Tokach, Dritz, & Nelssen, 2012), widely used by producers 
in Brazil and Mexico. Since China is not alone in banning this additive—the 
E.U. and Russia, for example, have a similar stance—rather than dispute the 
rule, a more effective strategy for LAC exporters would be to adapt their 
production techniques. That was, for instance, the decision made by Chile, 
whose ban on ractopamine in 2012 led to an immediate boom in its exports 
to China, which almost doubled in 2013.
For some unclear reason, unlike poultry and beef, there are no signs 
that plant constraints for pork exports are being mitigated by the Hong 
Kong route. Exports to Hong Kong seem to be in line with the demand for 
the domestic market.37
Soybeans and maize. LAC exporters of soybeans and maize share concerns 
about the length and predictability of China’s approval process for GMOs, 
particularly in the face of the fast pace of technical progress in this area. 
Uncertainty about the likelihood of the approval and the time frame for 
this tends to delay the adoption of new and improved varieties that could 
benefit producers and consumers on both sides of the relationship. These 
concerns have been particularly acute among soybean exporters, which 
typically send more than 60 percent of their harvest to China (65 percent of 
LAC’s soybean exports in 2014 went to China), prompting the governments 
of Brazil and Argentina to ask for a trilateral meeting in the hope of a more 
coordinated, speedier process (SBA, 2013).
Delays in the process of GMO approvals have been particularly costly 
to maize exporters, with Argentina only starting to export in mid-2013, after 
years of negotiations (Reuters, 2013) and Brazil only able to sign a SPS 
protocol in 2014. As result, LAC has largely missed the import boom that 
started in 2010 and continues to account for only a tiny share of China’s 
maize imports, which are overwhelmingly dominated by the U.S. (Figure 28).
A brief examination of the data from the Office of Genetically 
Modified Organisms at China’s Ministry of Agriculture suggests that these 
delays might not be driven by the approvals of GMOs per se, but rather 
by lack of coordination and difficulties in signing SPS protocols. Table 3 
shows that from 2004 to 2014, China’s Ministry of Agriculture approved 
108 GMOs for use as raw materials, including LAC’s main export products. 
Another factor might be the issue of how competitive LAC’s maize exports 
of maize are, particularly in the face of tariffs that range from 20 percent 
37 IDB/INT with data from 
Comtrade.
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to 65 percent. Figure 29 shows that, except for a brief period, Brazil’s and 
Argentina’s prices, including import tariffs and VAT exemptions, have been 
systematically above the domestic wholesale prices.
LAC’s institutional responses to regulatory measures. LAC countries have 
given different institutional responses to these regulatory challenges, some 
Source: IDB-INT with COMTRADE data.
* HS-6 100510 and 100590.
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canola 1 5 6 5 17
cotton 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 15
maize 7 1 8 2 2 7 3 3 7 5 2 47
oilseed 
rape
3 2 1 2 8
rapeseed 3 3
soybean 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 4 2 16
sugar 
beets
1 1 2
Total by 
year
17 1 19 3 5 16 6 7 17 11 6 108
Source: IDB/INT with data from the Office of Genetically Modified Organisms at China’s Ministry of 
Agriculture.
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TABLE 3/
 China’s GMO 
approvals by 
product, 2004–14
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more effective than others. Overall, though, what prevails is a very weak 
presence on the ground in China, with most countries lacking the technical 
and financial resources to avoid the worst impact of these measures. Even 
large countries with greater resources, such as Brazil and Mexico, are still in 
the process of putting adequate institutional infrastructure into place so as 
to effectively monitor—and eventually dispute—SPS measures and AQSIQ 
regulations. The contrast is particularly sharp with other major competitors 
in the agriculture business such as the U.S., Australia and New Zealand, 
which have plenty of such resources in place.
Brazil, for instance, waited until 2009 to send an agricultural attaché 
to the embassy in Beijing, a decision which, according to a former Brazilian 
ambassador to China, was pivotal in the country’s negotiations to open up 
the beef, poultry and pork markets. Likewise, Mexico has only recently taken 
measures to strengthen its resources on the ground, which it did by opting 
to open offices of its ministries of economy and agriculture in Beijing. Peru, 
despite its groundbreaking trade agreement, is still deciding on the best 
approach. According to interviews with officials at the Ministry of Foreign 
Commerce and Tourism, the embassy is in the process of receiving its first 
attaché.
Argentina appears to have the most developed institutional structure. 
Not only does the country have an office of its Ministry of Agriculture in 
Source: IDB/INT with data from Comtrade, NDRC Price Monitoring Center and CEIC.
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Beijing, similar to Mexico’s, with a team of five technicians, it also monitors 
SPS changes in China and has a way of sharing this information with 
Argentine agriculture companies, via the Argentine Agricultural Office, 
which operates an official website that translates China’s SPS measures 
and AQSIQ’s regulations into Spanish. The site also displays information 
about the main requirements for exporting different products to the 
Chinese market. Unfortunately, as mentioned earlier, these efforts have 
been hampered by domestic trade policy in Argentina.
These long overdue initiatives, which for the most part have yet to 
acquire a critical mass, seem to face a serious challenge in terms of access 
to high-level officials at China’s Ministry of Agriculture and, particularly, 
AQSIQ. A common complaint among LAC diplomats is that negotiations 
are often obstructed and delayed by the lack of dialogue with approval-
level officials, which make advances heavily dependent on sparse and 
cumbersome bilateral meetings between heads of state.
How exactly do technical barriers hurt LAC exports? The discussion so 
far of technical barriers and related price and quantity outcomes suggests 
that LAC exports have been critically affected in some cases, however it 
does not go so far as to provide a precise measurement of their impact. 
The evaluation of this impact is notoriously difficult, particularly when the 
objective is to cover all products in several countries. Case studies of goods 
and sectors in specific countries are much easier to conduct because 
they typically involve a single measure. When it comes to the universe of 
exports from 26 countries, the challenge is significantly more daunting as 
it requires lumping together highly varied measures and circumstances of 
trade, most of which are very difficult to quantify.
Despite these difficulties and limitations, this section makes an 
attempt to pin down the quantitative impact of these measures on LAC’s 
exports to China by resorting to the same gravity model used in the 
tariff simulations discussed earlier. Like tariffs, technical measures can 
distort trade flows away from what the partners’ size and geographical 
and cultural distances might lead one to expect. Unlike tariffs, though, 
technical measures cannot be easily quantified into an equivalent ad 
valorem. To address this challenge, this study employs a proxy that well 
known in trade literature, which consists of frequency ratios: that is, the 
percentage of products affected by technical measures within a chosen 
product category.38 Since the model is being run at the sector level (HS 
38 See, for instance, 
Fugazza, 2013, Li & Beghin, 
2012 and Disdier, Fontagné, 
& Mimoni, 2008.
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4-digits), the frequency ratios are calculated based on the number of 
products (HS 6-digits) within each sector that are being targeted by these 
measures.39
As expected, the results of the model point to technical barriers 
having a negative and statistically significant impact on LAC’s agricultural 
and manufacturing exports (see Technical Appendix). As in the tariff 
exercise, these results are used to assess the possible gains for LAC 
exporters of bringing down the frequency of China’s technical barriers 
to the OECD level. The magnitude of the change, shown in Figure 30, 
would involve cutting China’s frequencies to less than half the current 
levels for agriculture and to one-fifth for manufacturing. Figure 31 presents 
the results of the simulation for the two product categories. As can be 
seen, there are significant gains to be reaped in both categories, ranging 
from 13 percent to 17 percent in agriculture and from 25 percent to 34 
percent in manufacturing, if outliers are left out of the calculation. Overall, 
LAC agricultural and manufacturing exports to China would increase by 
16 and 22 percent, respectively. It is worth noting that these gains do 
not necessarily have to come through a reduction in frequency. A better 
understanding of Chinese technical standards either through greater 
transparency or greater research efforts from LAC governments and firms 
could also bring about similar effects.
Source: IDB/INT with data from Comtrade and the WTO.
Note: For each category, this figure presents the average percentage of HS 6-digit items within each 
HS 4-digit sector affected by SPS and/or TBTs, averaged over the 26 LAC countries exporting to 
China and the OECD. See appendix for detailed data.
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39 Another similar measure, 
the coverage ratio (i.e., 
the value share of exports 
affected by technical 
measures) was also used 
as a robustness check. This 
ratio, however, tends to 
underestimate the impact of 
technical barriers since the 
import value of the most 
affected products tends to 
be drastically reduced. See 
the technical appendix for 
more.
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Source: IDB/INT with data from WITS.
Note: This figure presents the distribution of the impacts at the HS 4-digit partner level covering all 
26 LAC countries. The median of the impacts is given by the line subdividing the boxes. The bottom 
and upper hinges of the boxes are, respectively, the first and third quartile of the distribution. The 
whiskers represent the maximum and minimum impacts within 1.5 times the distance between the 
first and third quartile. Outliers beyond this range were not plotted. The simulation is based on a 
global sectoral gravity model with fixed effects, described in the Technical Appendix (Table A1, 
specification 2). See Table 1 for category definitions. Data is for 2013.
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A 
casual observer of China–LAC trade might be forgiven for concluding 
that Chinese exporters face little obstacles when trying to access the 
Latin American market. After all, China’s exports to LAC—roughly 95 
percent of them consisting of a wide variety of manufacturing goods—have 
surged in the last 15 years, growing at a breakneck average annual growth 
rate of 19 percent. Figure 32, which focuses on manufacturing imports from 
LAC’s main markets, shows that this surge took place across the board, with 
China’s share of the region’s manufacturing imports increasing sevenfold to 
21.4 percent.
The reality, though, is much more complex and nuanced. There is 
little doubt that LAC has gone a long way toward liberalizing its trade—
the average MFN tariff dropped from 40 percent in the mid-1980s to 10 
percent in the second half of the 2000s—and a lot has also been done 
toward eliminating non-tariff barriers and deepening regional integration 
(63 FTAs signed, covering an average of 50 percent of the region’s 
trade). However, not every country has moved at the same pace, leaving 
a significant variation in the level and composition of protection across 
the region.
Accessing the Latin American 
market: trade barriers to Chinese 
firms
Source: IDB-INT with WITS data.
Note: Manufacturing imports are defined as STIC REV3, itens 1, 25, 266, 267, 269 and 5 to 9. The share 
is defined with regard to manufacturing imports from the world. 
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For Chinese exporters, this variation is compounded by different 
reactions to the surge in their sales, which broadly reflect countries’ 
different development strategies and specialization patterns. The bottom 
line is that, despite LAC’s trade liberalization and the surge in the region’s 
exports, Chinese firms still face considerable tariff and non-tariff barriers in 
a significant number of LAC countries. These barriers might not have been 
as effective in stopping the surge as some policymakers might have hoped, 
but they can hardly be considered harmless to producers and consumers 
on both side of the relationship. This section offers a broad overview of 
these barriers, with a focus on manufacturing goods, which, as mentioned 
earlier, account for more than 90 percent of China’s exports to LAC.
Tariff barriers: It depends on where you go
Figure 33 largely sums up the uneven (applied) tariff terrain faced by 
Chinese firms when exporting to LAC in the country and sector dimensions. 
The averages are weighted by China’s exports to the world to avoid any 
bias arising from the impact of LAC’s tariffs on China’s exports to the 
region. Brazil and Argentina sit at one end of the spectrum, with levels of 
Source: IDB-INT with WTO tariff data and IDB INTrade data. 
Note: Simple averages based on SITC Rev 3, 5 to 8. Data for El Salvador is for 2013. 
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protection that are well above those of other countries in the region as they 
try to protect their manufacturing interests across the board, largely in vain. 
At the other end are countries such as Chile, Peru and Costa Rica, which 
have long embraced free trade policies and, in the case of the first two, have 
dwindling interests in manufacturing. Market access in these cases was 
further improved, as mentioned in the previous section, by signing FTAs 
with China.40 At the sectoral level, it is clear that Chinese exporters have 
a significantly greater challenge in labor-intensive industries, a common 
pattern across all LAC countries except Chile.
Other important characteristics of LAC tariff barriers are a substantial 
“binding overhang” and a noticeable tariff escalation. The former is related 
to the gap between bound tariffs (the tariff commitments made at the 
WTO) and applied MFN tariffs. As can be seen in Figure 34, this gap is huge 
for most countries in the region and may pose a significant risk for China’s 
exporters since it leaves considerable room for sudden tariff increases, 
except when bound by FTAs.
Tariff escalation is also prevalent in most LAC countries, as final 
manufacturing goods are subject to tariffs that are, on average, 97 percent 
higher tariffs than intermediate goods (Figure 35). How much this has 
been hurting China’s exports to LAC is hard to tell. Whereas there seem 
to be good grounds for believing that tariff escalation matters for the 
diversification and sophistication of LAC’s exports to China, the growing 
Source: IDB-INT with WITS data.
Note: Simple averages  based on SITC Rev 3, 5 to 8 .
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40 Chile’s FTA with China, 
which entered into force in 
2006 and included a 10-year 
tariff phase-out schedule, 
will cover 97 percent of 
tariff lines in 2017. The 
FTA with Peru, which was 
ratified in 2010, has a longer 
schedule (17 years) but will 
reach 90 percent of tariff 
lines in 2020, while that with 
Costa Rica, enforced in 2011, 
has a 15-year schedule. See 
http://www.sice.oas.org/
agreements_e.asp
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FIGURE 35/
LAC MFN 
tariffs, final vs. 
intermediate goods. 
2013 (%)
diversification and sophistication of China’s exports to the region 
suggest that the reverse might not be true. Still, this does not rule out an 
economically significant effect. For instance, this bias might be behind the 
fact that final consumption goods accounted for only 15 percent of China’s 
exports to LAC in 2014, where the same figure for the U.S. market was 
approximately 30 percent.41
How exactly do tariffs hurt China’s exports? The evidence presented so 
far suggests a mixed picture: on the one hand, there is little doubt that the 
tariffs faced by Chinese exporters are still significantly high in most LAC 
countries, particularly in the MERCOSUR; on the other, they do not seem 
to have stopped these exporters from making significant inroads in the 
region. The burning question, then, is exactly how binding are these tariffs 
for Chinese exporters? Also, what kind of response can be expected if LAC 
embarks on bilateral or unilateral initiatives to lower tariffs on Chinese 
manufacturing goods? As discussed in Chapter 1, which addressed the 
other side of the relationship, a simple exercise using a sectoral gravity 
model may offer important clues toward answering these questions.
As in the exercise with China’s tariffs, the idea here is to simulate 
the impact of cutting LAC’s tariffs on Chinese manufacturing exports at 
the partner-product (HS 4-digit) level to OECD levels. Figure 36 presents 
Source: IDB/INT with data from WITS based on UNCTAD-SOP classification for final and intermediate 
goods.
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41 IDB/INT with data 
from WITS based on 
broad economic category 
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the tariff distribution for Chinese exporters in both regions to illustrate the 
magnitude of these cuts: LAC’s median tariff is nearly twice as high as that 
of the OECD and there is much greater variance in its tariffs.
The results of the simulation (see Figure 37) make it clear that despite all 
the trade liberalization and the boom in China’s exports to the region, tariffs 
still represent a significant obstacle for manufacturing exporters of several 
products. Leaving the outliers aside, the increases across the manufacturing 
Source: IDB/INT with data from WITS.
Note: These are simple averages of MFN and preferential tariffs at the partner HS 4-digit level faced 
by China manufacturing exporters in the 26 LAC countries and the OECD. See Table 1 for category 
definitions. Data is for 2013.
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covering all 26 LAC countries. The median of the impacts is given by the line subdividing the boxes. 
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is based on a global sectoral gravity model with fixed effects, described in the Technical Appendix 
(Table A2, specification 2). See Table 1 for category definitions. Data is for 2013.
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sector would range from 7 percent to 28 percent, with a 16 percent median 
impact. Overall, Chinese manufacturing exports would grow by 10 percent.
Non-tariff barriers: A significant obstacle in the MERCOSUR
As with tariffs, Chinese exporters face a very varied landscape of NTBs 
when trying to export to the region. As might be expected, the problems 
are concentrated in the same countries where tariffs remain a significant 
obstacle, mostly among Mercosur countries and, to a considerably lesser 
extent, Mexico and Colombia. These barriers could be divided into two 
categories: those that are, a priori, legitimate trade defense measures, 
the implementation of which is ambiguous given the safeguard and anti-
dumping provisions in China’s WTO Accession Protocol; and other less 
regulated and more opaque measures, such as import licenses, technical 
barriers, local content and customs valuation.
Trade defense measures
These are the best documented barriers and the data suggest that the use 
of this type of instrument in LAC has increased sharply so as to stop Chinese 
exports in the last decade. The number of cases has followed a clearly 
upward trend, reaching a peak of 38 initiated cases in 2013, accounting 
for 36 percent of the region’s contingent trade measures (Figure 38). The 
action, however, has been heavily concentrated within a small group of 
Source: IDB/INT with data from the World Bank Temporary Trade Barriers Database.
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countries with stronger manufacturing interests and products, and has 
focused on a specific type of instrument: anti-dumping.
Figure 39 breaks down this activity by type of instrument and gives 
some perspective on its relevance through comparison with China’s other 
major trade partners. As can be seen, anti-dumping—probably because of 
its less stringent regulatory requirements—was the most intensively used 
instrument by a large margin, with numbers of cases well beyond those of 
the U.S. and the European Union. Safeguards come a distant second and 
there has been little use of countervailing duties, which have been more 
prevalent in countries such as the U.S. The following paragraphs look at the 
dynamics of these contingent trade measures in more detail.
Anti-dumping. As Figure 40 shows, Argentina, Brazil and Mexico are the 
LAC countries with the largest number of anti-dumping cases initiated and 
enforced against China over the past 10 years. Combined, they account 
for 77 percent of the cases initiated in this period. Other countries such 
as Colombia and Peru also have been active, but their cases amount to 
less than those of Argentina. Peru, in particular, had a sharp drop in anti-
dumping activity after signing its FTA with China in 2009.
Anti-dumping measures can take the form of a duty contingent on 
prices falling below a certain level or just an unconditional duty. Moreover, 
duties can be defined as a specific amount per unit, such as cents per 
kilogram, or in ad valorem terms, such as a percentage of the price. Figure 41 
shows that LAC measures against China, driven mostly by Brazil, rely more 
Source: IDB/INT with data from the World Bank Temporary Trade Barriers Database.
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FIGURE 40/
Anti-dumping 
cases initiated 
and enforced by 
LAC against China, 
2000–14
Source: IDB/INT with data from the World Bank Temporary Trade Barriers Database.
Note: This figure only covers a subset of the cases shown in Figure 40 for which there is detailed 
information about the type of duties implemented. 
Specific duty
Ad valorem duty
European Union United States LAC
0
71
63
26
5
47
Duty if price falls under 0 322
Specific duty
Ad valorem duty
Brazil Colombia PeruMexico
0
0
5
0
43
1
Duty if price falls under 17 1
10
8
30
Argentina
5
15
12
0 2010 4030 706050 80
LAC
European Union
United States
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Brazil
Argentina
Colombia
Mexico
Peru
Source: IDB/INT with data from the World Bank Temporary Trade Barriers Database.
Enforced
Initiated
Brazil Colombia Peru UruguayMexicoArgentina
0 3010 20 40 50 60 70 80
Brazil
Argentina
Mexico
Colombia
Peru
Uruguay
45 41 22 20 11 1
72 56 40 37 12 1
FIGURE 41/
LAC anti-dumping 
measures against 
China, 2000–14
49ACCESSING THE LATIN AMERICAN MARkET: TRADE BARRIERS TO CHINESE FIRMS
heavily on specific duties than the U.S. and Europe. As is well known, this 
type of duty is more likely to create distortions and uncertainty for both 
importers and exporters, as its impact depends on the prevailing price 
of the product. Government officials in Brazil, though, often justify their 
use on the grounds that invoice prices for Chinese imports systematically 
underestimate the actual prices paid by importers.
Despite this surge in anti-dumping activity, the number of cases has 
not gone beyond 1.2 percent of the region’s imports from China (Figure 42), 
even at their peak, and were concentrated in sectors such as articles of iron 
and steel, textile and footwear, electrical machinery and equipment and 
mechanical machinery and equipment, which accounted for 56 percent of 
all cases and for 47 percent of the affected trade flows (Figure 43).
Without a detailed analysis of each of these cases—which is beyond 
the scope of this study—it would be impossible to assess if they reflected 
legitimate concerns or if they were driven by protectionism. However, the 
non-recognition of China as a market economy by the most active users 
casts a cloud over the legitimacy of these of anti-dumping measures. Brazil, 
Argentina, Mexico and Colombia have all been using the “surrogate country 
method” in their anti-dumping cases, taking advantage of Section 15 of 
China’s WTO Accession Protocol, which states that if a country does not 
recognize China as a market economy, it may resort to a methodology that 
is not based on China’s domestic prices or costs.42
As is widely recognized, the surrogate country method leaves 
considerable room for anti-dumping rates that are outright protectionist, 
Source: IDB/INT with data from the World Bank Temporary Trade Barriers Database.
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42 Brazil and Argentina 
formally recognized China 
as a market economy 
in 2004, but have never 
enforced this by law. Peru, 
which is also among the 
anti-dumping users in 
Figure 40, granted China 
market economy status in 
2004 but only enforced this 
in 2007, during negotiations 
of its FTA with China. For 
details, see, for example, 
IBA, 2010. http://docsonline.
wto.org/imrd/directdoc.
asp?DDFDocuments/t/
WT/L/432.doc.
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with little consideration for the facts on the ground. This much is clear, for 
instance, in Brazil’s choice of surrogate country. Between 2010 and 2013, 
60 percent of the countries chosen were in the OECD and 22 percent 
in LAC, all of them bearing little similarity with China in terms of factor 
Source: IDB/INT with data from the World Bank Temporary Trade Barriers Database and Comtrade. 
Value distribution based on 2013 trade flows. Distribution of numbers of cases based on the 
accumulated number of enforced cases in the 2000–14 period.
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prices, technology, geography or per capita income.43 The same kind 
of practice is also observed among other LAC users of anti-dumping 
measures against China.44
Despite their relevance, the days of the region’s apparent excesses 
in terms of anti-dumping might be numbered, as these are associated 
with China’s WTO Accession Protocol and the special provision on market 
economy status is set to expire at the end of 2016. There seems to be, 
however, different interpretations of the language of the protocol, with 
some key trade partners arguing that it does not imply automatic market 
economy recognition from all WTO members; or, in other words, it does not 
imply that surrogate country method can no longer be used after 2016.45
Whatever interpretation prevails, it does not seem to be in the 
interests of LAC or China to allow regulatory loopholes to be used to 
distort trade, as this harms both consumers and producers. If there are still 
doubts about the nature of the Chinese economy, the very least that LAC 
countries could do would be to allow and encourage Chinese exporters to 
submit their evidence on a case-by-case basis, a procedure that is already 
written into most anti-dumping legislation in the region, but rarely used.46
How effective are the measures? Legitimate or not, there remains the 
question of how effective these anti-dumping measures have been in 
stopping Chinese exports. A careful econometric analysis of this activity 
among the heaviest users in the region—Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and 
Mexico—paints a mixed picture. Using firm-level data from China Customs 
for 2000–12 and anti-dumping data from the World Bank Global Anti-
dumping Database, the analysis covers 79 affirmative anti-dumping actions 
against China, involving 171,567 country-firm-product-year observations.47 
The main findings point to a substantial trade-dampening effect in Brazil, 
Mexico and Argentina, whereas Colombia’s anti-dumping measures seem 
to have failed to stop Chinese exports on the whole (Figure 44).
This impact is also broken down into number of exporters (extensive 
margin) and export volume by exporter (intensive margin). In the case of 
Brazil and Mexico, the trade dampening effect is evenly explained by intensive 
and extensive margin negative effects. In Argentina, the intensive margin 
dominates the results, whereas in Colombia there is some weak evidence that 
the negative impact, if any, was through the extensive margin. Other results 
covering the impacts of anti-dumping measures on prices and trade deflection 
(that is, the deflection of Chinese exports to other non-LAC countries) do not 
43 Oliveira, 2015 .
44 See IBA op. cit, Box 9.
45  http://insidetrade.com/
daily-news/2016-slim-
trade-bills-debate-will-
abound-china-tpp-wto. 
Posted December 28, 
2015. the Ministry of 
Commerce’s Trade Remedy 
and Investigation Bureau 
argues that China should 
automatically be granted 
market economy status 
after 2016 and that its 
trade partners should start 
utilizing Chinese data to run 
anti-dumping investigations. 
The bureau is also aware 
that some countries may 
not adhere to this decision 
and mentioned in an 
interview that is prepared 
to consider starting cases 
against them at the WTO 
(interview with Ministry of 
Commerce officials).
46 See IBA op. cit. and 
Oliveira 2015.
47 Zhang 2016.
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suggest they have been statistically significant, except for the case of Mexico, 
where the prices of Chinese products affected by anti-dumping measures 
increased by 11.2 percent on average after the investigation.48
Safeguards. According to the WTO definition, safeguard measures should 
be applied to a product “irrespective of its source.”49 China, however, has 
become a notable exception as a transitional provision included in its 
Accession Protocol allowed WTO members to target the country’s exports 
until December 2013.50 Despite requirements that were significantly less 
stringent than the general safeguard protocol, this instrument was little 
used by LAC, with just a few cases initiated in four countries, only two of 
which were enforced: the Dominican Republic on lavatories and washbasins 
and Peru on textiles and clothing (Figure 45). The region’s behavior was 
not significantly different from that of the U.S. and the European Union, 
which have also barely used these measures.
However, these China-specific safeguards might not capture 
all LAC’s safeguard activity against China, since other more general 
safeguard instruments could also have been used, particularly after 2013. 
Safeguard instruments, by definition, are supposed to cover all trade 
partners, but their use might have been motivated by surge of imports 
from China. In fact, since 2002, 68 percent of the general safeguard cases 
initiated by LAC were related to goods which China is among the main 
exporters of, mainly textiles, footwear, electric and electronic equipment 
Source: IDB/INT with data from Zhang , 2016.
Note: This figure presents the average impact on China’s exports of anti-dumping measures adopted 
during 2000–12. It was estimated using a difference-in-difference model with data at the product HS 
6-digit level, with product and year fixed effects. See Zhang, 2016 for details.
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FIGURE 44/
Trade-dampening 
effects of selected 
LAC countries’ 
anti-dumping 
measures against 
China, 2000–12, 
percentages
48 Zhang, 2016, Table 11.
49 https://www.wto.org/
english/docs_e/legal_e/25-
safeg_e.htm.
50 See Section 16 of the 
Accession Protocol. 
http://docsonline.wto.
org/imrd/directdoc.
asp?DDFDocuments/t/
WT/L/432.doc.
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FIGURE 45/
China-specific 
safeguards initiated 
and enforced by 
selected countries 
and breakdown 
by LAC countries, 
2002–14
and steel (Figure 46). Overall, though, the number of cases remains 
relatively small—particularly when compared to anti-dumping activity—
and is highly concentrated in the smaller economies of the region and 
covers just a fraction of bilateral trade.
Countervailing duties. As with safeguards, Chinese exporters seem to have 
been little affected by the use of countervailing duties in LAC. Between 
2002–14, LAC countries filed just one case against China regarding exports 
of amoxicillin (HS Chapter 29) to Mexico in 2011, which was later withdrawn, 
meaning that LAC lagged well behind countries such as the U.S. in this 
regard (Figure 47). Paradoxically, given the above-average size of the 
Chinese state, the region was much more active in pursuing countervailing 
cases against the rest of the world, with 24 cases initiated and 12 enforced 
in the same period, more in line with this activity in the E.U. and the U.S.
Source: IDB/INT with data from the World Bank Temporary Trade Barriers Database.
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Other non-tariff barriers
In this group of less regulated and more opaque measures, Chinese firms 
face challenges that are distributed geographically in a way that is similar 
to the other barriers, that is, they are heavily concentrated among a few 
countries, led by Brazil and Argentina, and followed with a considerable 
distance by Mexico, Ecuador and Colombia. The most important issues 
Source: IDB/INT with data from the World Bank Temporary Trade Barriers Database.
Note: data on measures was only available for five LAC countries. 
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FIGURE 47/
Countervailing 
cases initiated and 
enforced against 
China and ROW, 
2002–14
seem to have revolved around import licenses, local content and trade-
related investment measures (TRIMs), TBTs and customs valuations. That 
much is clear in the market access reports published by China’s Ministry of 
Commerce.51 Brazil and Argentina come top of the list of complaints, with 
former being the object of concerns related to non-automatic licenses, 
customs valuation, local content rules for government procurement and 
trade-related tax incentives. Argentina is cited for arbitrary use of non-
automatic import licenses and restrictive TBTs, while Mexico raises concerns 
with customs valuation and expensive and unwarranted TBTs, particularly 
with regard to labeling.
These reports tend to be geographically biased because they focus 
on the largest LAC markets. However, their choice of countries seems to be 
corroborated by more objective assessments of trade policy trends around 
the region, including the WTO trade policy reviews. Brazil and Argentina, 
for instance, clearly experienced major trade policy reversals in the second 
half of the 2000s, and even though these were driven by overall shifts 
Source: IDB/INT with data from the World Bank Temporary Trade Barriers Database.
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51 China’s Ministry of 
Commerce has created two 
different alert reports. The 
first is an annual foreign 
market access report that 
compiles aspects of trade 
policy and the main trade 
and investment barriers for 
selected countries. The report 
was first issued in 2005 and 
covers 13 selected countries 
including Brazil, Mexico 
and Argentina. The second 
is a fortnightly bulletin 
prepared by the Ministry of 
Commerce’s Trade Remedy 
and Investigation Bureau that 
lists new non-tariff measures 
issued by most of China’s 
trade partners. See http://gpj.
mofcom.gov.cn/article/d/cw/.
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in economic policy and ended up affecting all trade partners, Chinese 
competition seems to have one of the strongest motivations.
In Brazil, trade policy objectives pivoted from integration to openly 
protecting local industry by resorting to all policy tools available, ranging 
from higher taxes on imported goods to increasingly restrictive local 
content requirements for government procurement and less transparent 
import licensing requirements and customs valuations.52 It could be argued 
that the turning point was the decision to extend the imposition of two 
indirect taxes to imports in 2004, the Programa de Integração Social (Social 
Integration Program, PIS) and the Contribuição para o Financiamento da 
Seguridade Social (Contribution for Social Security Financing, COFINS).53 
As shown in Figure 48 this apparently simple measure, when combined 
with the import tariffs applied to non-Mercosur countries, doubled the 
average protection for local production.
The PIS/COFINS measure was later followed by a string of other NTBs, 
with the highest impacts coming from a 30 percentage point increase in 
sales taxes on imported cars, later repackaged as a new automotive regime 
named InovarAuto; and the up to 25 percent margin of preference for local 
firms in government procurement, both part of the Brasil Maior plan.54 
InovarAuto is of particular interest because the motivation seems to be 
closely related to an attempt to stop the growing flow of Chinese imports. 
As shown in Figure 49, car imports from China quickly reached 4 percent 
FIGURE 48/
Brazil’s average 
MFN import tariff 
and the PIS-
COFINS, 2012 (%)
52 See, for instance, 
Frischtak & Mesquita 
Moreira, 2015 and WTO, 
2013.
53 PIS and COFINS are 
federal taxes imposed 
monthly on firms’ gross 
revenue at rates for most 
goods of 1.65 percent and 
7.6 percent, respectively. 
http://www.receita.fazenda.
gov.br/pessoajuridica/
pispasepcofins/
54 The InovarAuto 
automotive regime 
(Decree 7819, October 
2012) establishes that 
all producers, local or 
otherwise, are subject to 
a higher tax unless they 
meet certain conditions 
such as local production, 
65 percent local content, 
investing 0.5 percent of 
gross revenues in R&D and 
meeting certain energy 
efficiency criteria. See 
http://www.planalto.gov.
br/ccivil_03/_ato2011-
2014/2012/Decreto/D7819.
htm.
Source: Own calculation based on Receita Federal data.
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FIGURE 49/
Brazil’s car imports 
from China before 
and after the 
introduction of 
InovarAuto
55 WTO Dispute Settlement 
DS472, Brazil — certain 
measures concerning 
taxation and charges, 2013.
56 Ministerio de Industria, 
2011.
57 See https://www.wto.org/
english/tratop_e/dispu_e/
cases_e/ds438_e.htm and 
WTO, 2015.
of the domestic market in 2011 but dropped sharply after the tax increase. 
Despite the obvious impact and questionable legality of the measure, the 
Chinese government did not dispute it at the WTO and only reserved its 
third-party rights in a case brought against InovarAuto by the E.U. in 2013.55
Argentina’s trade policy has followed a similar protectionist trend 
in the last decade and, as in the case of Brazil, this seems to have been 
driven more by an overall shift in economic policy than by a specific 
response to Chinese competition. All the same, it is very likely that Chinese 
exporters were affected by these changes, particularly after 2012, when the 
government released plans to openly pursue import substitution.56
The most significant measures are summarized by the complaints to 
the WTO from the E.U., the U.S., Japan and Mexico in 2012, which were 
later upheld by a dispute resolution panel. The measures focused on the 
restrictive use of import licenses (Declaraciones Juradas Anticipadas de 
Importación, DJAIs) and a number of trade-related requirements (TRRs) 
such as: “(a) offsetting the value of imports with, at least, an equivalent 
value of exports (one-to-one requirement); (b) limiting imports, either in 
volume or in value (import reduction requirement); (c) reaching a certain 
level of local content in domestic production (local content requirement); 
(d) making investments in Argentina (investment requirement); and, 
(e) refraining from repatriating profits from Argentina (non-repatriation 
requirement).”57 As in the case of Brazil, China refrained from challenging 
Argentina directly at the WTO, and only secured its third-party rights in 
these consultations. The good news about these trade restrictions is that 
Argentina’s new administration, which took over in December 2015, has 
Source: IDB/INT with data from the Brazilian Ministry of Development Industry and Trade.
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made a clear commitment to dismantle them and has already abolished 
import licenses and most TRRs.58
The other LAC countries that show up on the Ministry of Commerce’s 
radar have not experienced the same dramatic shifts in trade policy seen in 
Brazil and Argentina. Existing NTBs, some of them adopted only recently, 
are few and far between and mostly target labor-intensive industries, which 
have been particularly hurt by Chinese competition. In Mexico, for instance, 
aside from the potentially arbitrary use of TBTs mentioned in the Ministry of 
Commerce’s reports, labor-intensive sectors such as textiles and shoes have 
been singled out recently (2014) for more restrictive import procedures 
involving reference prices, limited entry at customs facilities, sector-specific 
records and advance notices.59 Toy imports, in turn, have been subjected to 
a TRQ since 2009, with out-of-quota tariffs of 15 percent.60
In Colombia, NTBs are almost exclusively an issue for agricultural 
imports, with a wide range of products being subjected to TRQs (294 
tariff lines in 2015). In manufacturing, which is at the core of China’s export 
interests, the only issue has been the adoption of “temporary” specific taxes 
on clothing, shoes and textiles, which are more akin to a tariff than an NTB 
measure.61 In Ecuador, another country that figures in reports from China’s 
Ministry of Commerce, most of the trade restriction action has focused on 
tariffs, mainly motivated by balance of payment considerations.62 There 
has been, though, an incipient but worrying pattern of temporary and 
unpredictable bans and quotas for products such as cars, cell phones and 
air-conditioning equipment.
58 See http://www.infoleg.
gob.ar/infolegInternet/
anexos/255000-
259999/257180/norma.htm
59 See http://www.
globaltradealert.
org/measure/
mexico8restrictivepolicies 
footwearimports and 
http://www.globaltradealert.
org/measure/
mexicovariousimport 
restrictionstextileproducts.
60 See (World Trade 
Organization, 2013).
61 See WTO tariff analysis 
(http://tao.wto.org/) and 
http://www.globaltradealert. 
org/measure/colombia 
temporaryimporttaxclothing 
andshoes. The latest 
temporary import tax on 
these products was adopted 
in February 2014, for a 
period of two years.
62 See (Ferro, 2015).
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Conclusions
T
his report has made a concerted effort to draw attention to a trade 
agenda that remained largely ignored during the boom. Mesmerized 
by epic export gains, both sides of the relationship largely looked the 
other way when it came to tariffs and non-tariff barriers and, as a result, 
have essentially failed to document, measure their impact and negotiate 
their removal. As in the leaky roof metaphor, the boom years would perhaps 
have been the best time to have addressed these issues, because the 
impressive gains could have mitigated the ensuing political and economic 
challenges of compensating the losers. Now that the boom is over and it is 
effectively raining, this agenda is likely to be more challenging and costly, 
but at the same time more urgent, particularly for LAC: South America 
can no longer count on booming exports of a few commodities, while 
Central America and Mexico continue to face a sizeable and growing trade 
imbalance with China.
For this agenda to be effectively addressed, trade negotiations 
need to be as insulated as possible from the political and ideological 
considerations that have marked so far China’s relationship with a number 
of commodity-producing countries in the region. It seems clear that the fear 
of upsetting diplomatic relations led many countries to overlook important 
trade frictions, giving them undue political and strategic status. These 
frictions should be viewed as what they are: disputes that are an integral 
part of the daily routine of global trade. Likewise, unrealistic expectations 
as to foreign direct investment (FDI) and aid flows seem to have often 
dampened attempts at serious trade negotiations, even though these flows 
can be seen, at best, as being complementary to trade. The benefits of FDI 
can only be maximized in the context of low trade barriers, and aid flows 
cannot be the basis for any sustainable bilateral relationship.
An effective trade agenda would also require greater investments by 
both governments and private sectors in what could generally be termed 
trade intelligence: that is, a comprehensive monitoring of trade barriers in 
both markets. China seems to be one step ahead in this sense: the Ministry 
of Commerce’s regular market access reports and bulletins clearly help to 
improve the knowledge and transparency of trade measures taken by LAC 
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governments, although they are still limited to the largest markets and are 
more descriptive than analytical.
In LAC, the state of trade intelligence is significantly more precarious. 
Chile seems to be the only country in the region which regularly monitors 
market access issues in China and makes this information available to the 
general public. Elsewhere, the initiatives are few and far between, mostly 
carried out on an ad hoc basis. This weakness extends to the private sector: 
even the few large firms that have managed to set foot in the Chinese 
market seem to have very limited resources on the ground to monitor, 
evaluate and lobby for the removal of trade barriers. This lack of a critical 
mass of trade intelligence is clearly undermining the region’s ability to 
design an effective trade agenda.
The actions needed to close this information gap are less of a technical 
challenge and more an issue of convincing governments and firms to raise 
trade intelligence to the top of their negotiating agenda and commit the 
necessary resources. In the particular case of LAC, there is clearly an 
opportunity to pool scarce public and private resources at the subregional 
or regional level to achieve this common objective. This sort of undertaking 
would be especially effective among countries that share specialization 
patterns, as exporters would likely be exposed to the same barriers. 
Initiatives such as the Pacific Alliance, for instance, are already pointing 
in this direction, with countries wanting to share commercial offices and 
pool resources for export promotion. Whatever the strategy chosen, one 
thing is certain: bilateral trade in this new post-boom phase stands to gain 
a lot from greater transparency and understanding of the impact of the 
remaining trade barriers. The majority of producers and consumers on both 
sides of the relationship are likely to be the main winners.
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Technical Appendix: Estimating 
trade effect of NTBs and tariffs
The Gravity Model
To assess the effect of NTBs and tariffs on international trade, the following 
extended panel gravity model was estimated using product level data,
,
(1)
where
i  is the reporting (importer) country,
j  is the partner (exporter) country,
t =  2002 ... ... 2013, denotes the sample period,
s  is the HS 4-digit product code,
  denotes country i’s imports from partner country j of product s 
in year t,
dist
ij
  denotes the distance between country i and country j,
Z  denotes a group of standard dummy variables included in the 
gravity model, such as common language, sharing the same 
border, etc. A dummy variable for FTAs is also included in Z,
GDP
it
  denotes country i’s GDP at year t,
POP
it
  denotes country i’s population at year t,
NTB
ijt
 denotes the measure of country i’s NTBs on imports from 
country j of product s in year t, 
UNCOVERING THE BARRIERS OF THE CHINA–LATIN AMERICA AND CARIBBEAN TRADE66
  denotes the applied tariff rate country imposes on imports 
from country j of product s in year t.
Bilateral imports are classified into three sectors—agriculture, 
manufacturing and metal—following WTO classifications.
D
agriculture
 is a dummy variable that is equal to one if product s is from 
the agriculture sector, zero otherwise,
Dmanufacture is a dummy variable that is equal to one if product s is 
from the manufacturing sector, zero otherwise,
Dmetal is a dummy variable that is equal to one if product s is from 
the metal sector, zero otherwise,
Diregion is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the reporting 
country i belongs to a region, zero otherwise,
Djregion is a dummy variable that is equal to one if partner country j 
belongs to a region, zero otherwise.
Data
Bilateral import data at HS 6-digit level was obtained from UN-Comtrade. 
It includes 157 reporting countries for the period 2002–13. For the 
regression, import data was aggregated at the HS 4-digit level. Data on 
GDP and population was obtained from the WDI of the World Bank. Data 
on distance and other standard gravity dummy variables is from the CEPII 
gravity dataset.
The measurement of NTBs is derived from the WTO NTB notifications. 
Each member country notifies the WTO of the NTBs it applies to trade in 
merchandise. Each notification provides information on which category the 
NTB belongs to, which countries are affected, which products are involved 
and when the notification was initiated. The notification data set is available 
on the Integrated Trade Intelligence Portal (I-TIP) for Goods.63 The initiation 
date is the date when the measure is made known to other WTO members. 
The in-force date is the date when the measure comes into force. On the 
I-TIP, the in-force date may or may not be notified for SPS and TBTs, in 
which case the in-force date is assumed to be the same as the initiation 
date. As there is no information on the withdrawal date, the measure is 
assumed to be in force forever once it is initiated.
For each product at the HS 6-digit level that country i imports from 
country j in year t, the number of NTBs (both SPS and TBTs) is counted 
using the WTO NTB notification data. The data is then aggregated to the 
63 I-TIP provides 
comprehensive information 
on NTBs applied by WTO 
members to trade in 
merchandise. It includes 
members’ notifications 
of NTBs, such as TBTs, 
SPS, anti-dumping and 
countervailing measures, 
as well as information on 
“specific trade concerns” 
raised at WTO committee 
meetings.
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HS 4-digit level. The NTB variable is measured by the frequency ratio, that 
is, the percentage of the number of items (HS 6-digit level) under product 
(HS 4-digit level) for which there is at least one NTB. The interval of the 
frequency ratio is [0,1].
Data on tariffs is obtained from UNCTAD-TRAINS, with additional 
data from IDB INTrade Preferential Tariff data. The applied tariff is equal to 
the preferential rate if there is an FTA or a unilateral preferential agreement; 
otherwise it is equal to the MFN rate. When there are multiple preferential 
rates, the lowest one is applied.
Results
First, China’s imports from LAC are studied by equation (1). Regression 
results are reported in Table A1. Equation (1) is estimated using OLS with 
fixed effects (FEs). In column (1), importer_year, exporter_year, importer_
exporter and hs4digit FEs are included. In column (2), importer_year, 
exporter_year_hs4digit and importer_exporter FEs are included. In 
column (3), importer_year, exporter_year, importer_exporter_hs4digit and 
hs4digit_year FEs are included. In the regressions, all the standard errors 
are clustered by importer_exporter_hs4digit.
Importer_year_hs4digit FEs could not be included because there is 
not much variation across exporters for the NTBs imposed by importers. 
In the dataset, the NTB of an importer for a specific good and year is the 
same for all exporters. The only variation in this dimension comes from 
the composition of HS 6-digit items for each HS 4-digit product that two 
countries trade. Therefore, the variations across products and across 
importers are essential for identifying the effect of NTBs in this model.
Coefficient β
1
 measures the effect of NTBs on agricultural goods 
imports. Coefficient β
2
 measures the extra effect of NTBs on China’s 
imports of agricultural goods from LAC compared with the rest. When 
β
2
 is statistically significant, the effect of NTBs on China’s imports of 
agricultural goods from LAC is equal to β
1
 + β
2
. The same logic applies to 
the manufacturing sector and to tariffs. 
Second, LAC’s imports from China were studied and the results are 
reported in Table A2. 
To check for the robustness of the results and correct for the 
heteroscedasticity bias and the missing zero trade values of the log-
linear method (Santos Silva & Tenreyro, 2006), a modified version of the 
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 (1) (2) (3)
NTM_fr x ag –0.086***
(0.010)
–0.222***
(0.008)
–0.057***
(0.008)
NTM_fr x ag x im_CHN_ex_LAC 0.198
(0.257)
0.315
(0.231)
0.099
(0.168)
NTM_fr x manuf 0.069***
(0.006)
0.099***
(0.005)
0.001
(0.005)
NTM_fr x manuf x im_CHN_ex_LAC –0.343***
(0.092)
–0.404***
(0.071)
0.030
(0.071)
NTM_fr x metal 0.010
(0.014)
0.022*
(0.011)
0.027***
(0.010)
tariff x ag –1.532***
(0.031)
–1.501***
(0.027)
–0.169***
(0.020)
tariff x ag x im_CHN_ex_LAC –6.513***
(1.752)
–4.539***
(1.377)
–1.831**
(0.848)
tariff x manuf –2.130***
(0.026)
–2.642***
(0.024)
–0.695***
(0.022)
tariff x manuf x im_CHN_ex_LAC –2.842***
(1.010)
–4.644***
(0.736)
–0.367
(0.695)
tariff x metal –1.970***
(0.039)
–1.924***
(0.035)
–0.836***
(0.043)
tariff x metal x im_CHN_ex_LAC –28.186***
(2.268)
–17.382***
(1.665)
–1.672
(1.840)
FTA 0.029***
(0.005)
0.005
(0.005)
0.001
(0.005)
dmy_ag_im_CHN_ex_LAC –0.929***
(0.331)
dmy_manuf_im_CHN_ex_LAC –2.022***
(0.362)
–0.873***
(0.159)
 
 
dmy_metal_im_CHN_ex_LAC 0.301
(0.395)
Observations 27,000,155 27,000,155 27,000,155
R-squared 0.434 0.611 0.847
imp#year YES YES YES
exp#year YES NO YES
imp#exp YES YES NO
exp#year#hs4 NO YES NO
hs4 YES NO NO
imp#exp#hs4 NO NO YES
hs4#year NO NO YES
Note: Importer_exporter_hs4digit clustered standard errors in parentheses. FTA is dummy variable 
for free trade agreements. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
TABLE A1/
Regression results 
at HS 4-digit level. 
China imports from 
LAC. OLS
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 (1) (2) (3)
NTM_fr x ag –0.067***
(0.010)
–0.217***
(0.008)
–0.054***
(0.008)
NTM_fr x ag x im_LAC_ex_CHN
 
–0.317***
(0.109)
–0.008
(0.087)
–0.298***
(0.090)
NTM_fr x manuf 0.062***
(0.006)
0.094***
(0.005)
0.000
(0.005)
NTM_fr x manuf x im_LAC_ex_CHN
 
0.134**
(0.065)
0.186***
(0.047)
0.128***
(0.040)
NTM_fr x metal 0.022
(0.014)
0.027**
(0.011)
0.026***
(0.010)
tariff x ag
 
–1.523***
(0.031)
–1.505***
(0.027)
–0.171***
(0.020)
tariff x ag x im_LAC_ex_CHN –0.970*
(0.528)
1.129***
(0.438)
0.691
(0.556)
tariff x manuf
 
–2.231***
(0.026)
–2.658***
(0.024)
–0.684***
(0.022)
tariff x manuf x im_LAC_ex_CHN 8.141***
(0.235)
0.494***
(0.189)
–2.096***
(0.240)
tariff x metal
 
–2.069***
(0.039)
–1.940***
(0.035)
–0.815***
(0.043)
tariff x metal x im_LAC_ex_CHN 9.212***
(0.502)
0.234
(0.377)
–4.206***
(0.534)
FTA
 
0.034***
(0.005)
0.006
(0.005)
–0.000
(0.005)
dmy_ag_im_LAC_ex_CHN –1.374***
(0.109)
–0.690***
(0.089)
dmy_manuf_im_LAC_ex_CHN
 
0.376***
(0.058)
0.253***
(0.044)
 
 
dmy_metal_im_LAC_ex_CHN
Observations 27,000,155 27,000,155 27,000,155
R-squared 0.434 0.611 0.847
imp#year YES YES YES
exp#year YES NO YES
imp#exp YES YES NO
exp#year#hs4 NO YES NO
hs4 YES NO NO
imp#exp#hs4 NO NO YES
hs4#year NO NO YES
Note: Importer_exporter_hs4digit clustered standard errors in parentheses. FTA is dummy variable 
for free trade agreements.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
TABLE A2/
Regression results 
at HS 4-digit level 
using. LAC imports 
from China. OLS
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regressions above were estimated using the Poisson pseudo-maximum 
likelihood (PPML) method. The modifications were made to adjust the 
regressions to our computing power limitations and consisted of: (a) limiting 
the regressions to the 2-digit level; (b) taking into account only those zero 
trade values related to products (2 digits) that had been traded at least 
once between country-pairs in the sample period; and (c) using only one 
set of importer, exporter and 2-digit fixed effects (the PPML estimations 
with high-dimensional fixed effects did not converge). 
The results are reported in Tables A3 and A4, which, for comparisons 
purposes, also include the estimates of an OLS regression (column 1) at the 
2-digit level, with the same importer, exporter and 2-digit fixed effects of 
the PPML specification. The PPML results include two specifications that 
differ in their treatment of the zeros. Column 2 has only the non-zero values 
and column 3 includes them as specified above. The results suggest that 
the missing-zeros bias is not substantial as the coefficients do not change 
significantly. 
The OLS-PPML comparison shows that the direction of the effect of 
China’s tariffs and NTBs on LAC exports is robust to the estimation method. 
The magnitude of the impact, though, is mostly higher (column 1 and 3 in 
Table A3). The direction of the impacts is also generally consistent across 
methods in the case of LAC’s tariffs and NTBs on Chinese exports (Table 
A4); however, the PPML coefficients mostly suggest a smaller impact. 
Simulations
For the simulations presented in Figures 8, 31 and 37, the decision was to 
use the OLS coefficients derived from specification 2 in Tables A1 (Figures 
8 and 31) and A2 (Figure 37). This was mostly driven by the belief that 
this specification provided the balance between controlling for unobserved 
characteristics and having enough variation to identify the impacts. The 
PPML results were ruled out due to the risk of aggregation bias and the 
limitations in the use of fixed effects. Moreover, the results suggest that 
missing-zeros bias might not be significant. The simulations focused on 
those barriers—tariffs and NTBs for LAC exports to China and just tariffs 
for China’s exports to LAC—indicated to be binding by the available 
quantitative and qualitative evidence. 
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(1)
OLS
(2)
PPML 
no zero
(3)
PPML partial 
zero
NTM_fr x ag –0.182***
(0.019)
–0.401***
(0.072)
–0.414***
(0.072)
NTM_fr x ag x im_CHN_ex_LAC
 
–0.088
(0.365)
0.713*
(0.317)
0.791*
(0.313)
NTM_fr x manuf –0.067***
(0.022)
–0.126
(0.104)
–0.150
(0.104)
NTM_fr x manuf x im_CHN_ex_LAC
 
0.171
(0.252)
–1.038**
(0.472)
–0.955**
(0.440)
NTM_fr x metal 0.210***
(0.065)
0.576***
(0.178)
0.571***
(0.181)
tariff x ag
 
–2.135***
(0.063)
–0.444**
(0.224)
–0.521**
(0.221)
tariff x ag x im_CHN_ex_LAC –8.611***
(2.702)
–14.367***
(3.614)
–13.599***
(3.413)
tariff x manuf
 
–3.434***
(0.062)
–2.100***
(0.529)
–2.264***
(0.518)
tariff x manuf x im_CHN_ex_LAC –6.718***
(2.406)
–13.523*
(7.522)
–12.894*
(7.320)
tariff x metal
 
–4.394***
(0.126)
–0.302
(0.767)
–0.731
(0.770)
tariff x metal x im_CHN_ex_LAC –32.897***
(4.240)
–62.461***
(17.943)
–56.656***
(18.161)
FTA
 
0.418***
(0.011)
0.435***
(0.049)
0.452***
(0.049)
lg_dist –1.083***
(0.005)
–0.566***
(0.027)
–0.581***
(0.027)
contig
 
0.645***
(0.018)
0.402***
(0.058)
0.377***
(0.058)
comlang_off 0.374***
(0.011)
0.055
(0.057)
0.064
(0.057)
colony
 
0.425***
(0.024)
0.083
(0.071)
0.102
(0.073)
comcol 0.690***
(0.016)
0.411***
(0.147)
0.432***
(0.146)
curcol
 
1.145***
(0.113)
1.809***
(0.255)
1.821***
(0.256)
col45 0.340***
(0.034)
0.031
(0.127)
0.050
(0.130)
(continued on next page)
TABLE A3/
Regression results 
at HS 2-digit level. 
China imports from 
LAC, OLS vs PPML
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(1)
OLS
(2)
PPML 
no zero
(3)
PPML partial 
zero
smctry
 
0.121***
(0.026)
0.270*
(0.139)
0.276**
(0.138)
lg_GDP_curD_im 0.666***
(0.009)
0.593***
(0.034)
0.738***
(0.035)
lg_GDP_curD_ex
 
0.134***
(0.008)
0.405***
(0.025)
0.404***
(0.028)
lg_ppln_im 0.075***
(0.028)
–0.540***
(0.152)
–0.728***
(0.114)
lg_ppln_ex
 
–0.142***
(0.029)
0.439***
(0.123)
0.538***
(0.127)
dmy_manuf_im_CHN_ex_LAC –3.113***
(0.478)
–2.066**
(1.003)
0.520
(0.702)
dmy_metal_im_CHN_ex_LAC
 
 
 
0.259
(0.904)
2.720***
(0.628)
dmy_manuf –0.170
(0.268)
–0.096
(0.269)
dmy_metal
 
 
 
0.623***
(0.183)
0.746***
(0.185)
im_CHN_ex_LAC 2.916***
(0.373)
2.683***
(0.730)
ex_LAC
 
 
 
–3.972***
(1.045)
–2.268**
(1.082)
dmy_ag_im_CHN_ex_LAC –0.999
(0.613)
2.421***
(0.730)
im_CHN
 
 
 
 
 
8.737***
(0.989)
Constant –21.498***
(2.025)
–25.132***
(1.772)
Observations 5,295,119 5,295,119 10,485,943
R-squared 0.475 0.423 0.416
imp YES YES YES
exp YES YES YES
hs2 YES YES YES
year YES YES YES
Note: Imp_exp_hs2digit clustered standard errors in parentheses. FTA is dummy variable for free 
trade agreements.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
TABLE A3/
Regression results 
at HS 2-digit level. 
China imports from 
LAC, OLS vs PPML
(continued)
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(1)
OLS
(2)
PPML 
no zero
(3)
PPML partial 
zero
NTM_fr x ag –0.164***
(0.019)
–0.353***
(0.076)
–0.368***
(0.075)
NTM_fr x ag x im_LAC_ex_CHN
 
–0.099
(0.228)
0.473
(0.348)
0.441
(0.345)
NTM_fr x manuf –0.081***
(0.022)
–0.144
(0.105)
–0.168
(0.104)
NTM_fr x manuf x im_LAC_ex_CHN
 
0.252
(0.216)
–0.054
(0.221)
–0.042
(0.222)
NTM_fr x metal 0.265***
(0.065)
0.668***
(0.173)
0.662***
(0.176)
tariff x ag
 
–2.128***
(0.063)
–0.464**
(0.224)
–0.543**
(0.220)
tariff x ag x im_LAC_ex_CHN –2.490
(1.603)
–2.664
(1.919)
–2.781
(1.844)
tariff x manuf
 
–3.521***
(0.062)
–2.463***
(0.543)
–2.621***
(0.531)
tariff x manuf x im_LAC_ex_CHN 8.366***
(0.875)
–1.459
(1.526)
–1.364
(1.506)
tariff x metal
 
–4.473***
(0.127)
–0.569
(0.816)
–1.012
(0.811)
tariff x metal x im_LAC_ex_CHN 9.050***
(1.947)
10.104***
(2.084)
10.083***
(2.086)
FTA
 
0.415***
(0.011)
0.440***
(0.049)
0.458***
(0.049)
lg_dist –1.084***
(0.005)
–0.562***
(0.027)
–0.576***
(0.028)
contig
 
0.646***
(0.018)
0.408***
(0.058)
0.383***
(0.058)
comlang_off 0.376***
(0.011)
0.053
(0.057)
0.061
(0.057)
colony
 
0.425***
(0.024)
0.084
(0.071)
0.103
(0.073)
comcol 0.686***
(0.016)
0.417***
(0.148)
0.437***
(0.147)
curcol
 
1.144***
(0.113)
1.811***
(0.255)
1.826***
(0.256)
col45 0.336***
(0.034)
0.033
(0.127)
0.052
(0.130)
(continued on next page)
TABLE A4/
Regression results 
at HS 2-digit level. 
LAC imports from 
China, OLS vs PPML
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(1)
OLS
(2)
PPML 
no zero
(3)
PPML partial 
zero
smctry
 
0.123***
(0.026)
0.269*
(0.139)
0.275**
(0.139)
lg_GDP_curD_im 0.671***
(0.008)
0.603***
(0.034)
0.746***
(0.035)
lg_GDP_curD_ex
 
0.138***
(0.008)
0.405***
(0.025)
0.404***
(0.028)
lg_ppln_im 0.062**
(0.028)
–0.596***
(0.150)
–0.771***
(0.113)
lg_ppln_ex
 
–0.149***
(0.029)
0.435***
(0.123)
0.536***
(0.128)
dmy_manuf_im_LAC_ex_CHN 0.740***
(0.203)
2.418***
(0.339)
0.859***
(0.259)
dmy_metal_im_LAC_ex_CHN
 
 
 
0.102
(0.396)
–1.423***
(0.312)
dmy_manuf –0.165
(0.268)
–0.096
(0.269)
dmy_metal
 
 
 
0.630***
(0.183)
0.747***
(0.184)
im_LAC_ex_CHN –0.106
(0.173)
–1.574***
(0.283)
im_LAC
 
 
 
1.421***
(0.255)
4.532***
(0.596)
dmy_ag_im_LAC_ex_CHN –1.525***
(0.279)
–1.543***
(0.275)
ex_CHN
 
 
 
 
 
–2.456*
(1.323)
Constant –21.037***
(2.019)
–24.800***
(1.772)
Observations 5,295,119 5,295,119 10,485,943
R-squared 0.475 0.421 0.414
imp YES YES YES
exp YES YES YES
hs2 YES YES YES
year YES YES YES
Note: Imp_exp_hs2digit clustered standard errors in parentheses. FTA is dummy variable for free 
trade agreements.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
TABLE A4/
Regression results 
at HS 2-digit level. 
LAC imports from 
China, OLS vs PPML
(continued)
